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This study addresses the development of the general administrative capacity in 
Central and Eastern European countries. Such capacity is vital for their proper 
functioning as members of the EU. The study identifies deficiencies both in the 
candidate countries and in the administrative system of the Union itself, and 
subsequently it explores ways to cope with these shortcomings.  
 
This working document has been written for the project ‘Enlargement of the EU to 
Central and Eastern Europe’, which the Netherlands Scientific Council for Govern-
ment Policy (WRR) is currently undertaking. As such, it contributes to answering 
the central questions of this project: to what extent will enlargement cause 
problems for the proper functioning of the Union, and, hence, to what extent will 
reform of the existing institutions be needed to maintain their effectiveness, 
legitimacy and cohesion? 
 
In preparing for its forthcoming report to the Dutch government on these matters, 
the WRR has commissioned a number of studies and assessments. Background 
studies on ‘closer co-operation within the EU’ and on ‘higher education in Central 
and Eastern Europe’ have recently been published. Other studies will be published 
in the months to come. 
 
At the time this study was commissioned, the author, dr. A.J. G. Verheijen, was 
director of the International Programme at the Department of Public 
Administration at the Leiden University. At present, he is working at the United 
Nations Development Programme in Bratislava, as Chief Technical Advisor on 
Governance. 
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This background study, prepared for the Scientific Council for Government Policy 
(WRR), assesses the implications of enlargement with the candidate states from 
Central and Eastern Europe for the EU as a political and administrative system. 
The objective of the study is threefold:  
1 to provide insight into the nature of administrative capacity requirements for 
effective participation in the EU system. The paper will mainly focus on the 
development of general or horizontal administrative capacity requirements, as 
these are an important but often underestimated element of the EU member-
ship requirements; 
2 to analyse and assess the development of general administrative capacities in 
the ten candidate states from Central and Eastern Europe, as well as to 
identify the main factors that influence the development of modern and 
effective systems of public administration in these states; 
3 to identify possible ways in which the implications of the ‘Eastern 
Enlargement’ for the functioning of the EU as a political and administrative 
system can be addressed. 
 
The presence of adequate sectoral administrative capacities to guarantee the 
application of the acquis communautaire has always been part of the assessment 
of candidate states, even though in previous enlargement rounds this never was a 
key issue in the preparation and negotiations for membership. The administrative 
capacity of candidate states was either deemed sufficient (Austria, Finland and 
Sweden) or not considered a stumbling block for accession (earlier Mediterranean 
enlargement and the 1973 enlargement). The assessment of general or horizontal 
administrative capacities, however, is a rather new issue in the EU enlargement 
process. 
 
The increasing importance attached to meeting administrative capacity 
requirements can be seen both as an expression of general scepticism about the 
quality of the administrative systems of the candidate states, and as an illustration 
of the ever higher threshold which new member states will have to cross, mainly as 
a result of the completion of the Internal Market.  
 
The increasing pre-occupation of the European Commission with sectoral 
administrative capacity requirements, ever more obvious in recent years, can be 
understood mainly as an expression of concern with enforcing Internal Market 
standards in an EU of 27+ member states. However, even though the presence of 
adequate sectoral capacities is indeed a crucial capacity requirement, it is also 
important to devote adequate attention to bringing the general or horizontal 
administrative capacities (i.e. civil service system, policy processes) of candidate 
states up to the required level. The two key reasons why the development of 
adequate horizontal capacities is important are: 
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1 Sectoral capacities cannot develop in isolation; even if capacities in key 
sectoral areas are brought up to the required levels, the effect of this will be at 
most temporary if the overall administrative system is not functioning 
effectively. 
2 It is important to guarantee that the European policy process will be able to 
function effectively with 27+ member states. A relative similarity in levels of 
quality of the institutional systems of the member states is a necessary 
requirement for this. Too much differentiation in administrative capacities 
between member states could pose a serious threat to the ‘modus operandi’ of 
the EU as a politico-administrative system, which is based on mutual 
confidence between member states in each others institutions. This point has 
become all the more relevant in view of the already existing problems in the 
EU system. Mutual confidence has been eroded as a result of the problems 
some member states faced in coping with the workload generated by the 
completion of the Internal Market, and due to recent conflicts between 
member states, for instance in relation to the handling of the BSE crisis. 
 
General administrative capacity criteria were developed late in the process of 
defining and operationalising the EU membership criteria, which were first defined 
in a general way in the Copenhagen European Council Summit conclusions in 
June 1993. Explicit reference to horizontal administrative capacity requirements 
was made for the first time in the Madrid European Council Summit conclusions 
in December 1995. Whereas capacity requirements are relatively clear cut in 
matters of democracy or the Internal Market, in the area of administrative 
capacities a broadly shared understanding of membership requirements has been 
defined only very recently. 
 
The assessment of administrative capacities has been complicated by the lack of 
competencies of the European Union with regard to public administration. The 
European Commission, which plays a central role in the enlargement process, 
lacks the necessary expertise, in part as a result of its lack of involvement in this 
area. It can therefore hardly come as a surprise that the debate on administrative 
criteria for EU membership has for a long time been limited mainly to a debate on 
sectoral technical administrative capacities required to implement the acquis com-
munautaire. Horizontal administrative capacities (professional civil service, well-
developed accountability system, clear administrative structure, adequate horizon-
tal management functions) were assessed in a rather general way in the Commis-
sion Opinions (July 1997) and the Regular Reports on Progress (November 1998) 
only recently defined these in more detail. The 1999 Regular Reports on Progress 
are more comprehensive than the previous assessments in their analysis of hori-
zontal administrative capacities. 
 
The 1999 Reports used a new assessment system for the analysis of horizontal 
administrative capacities. The assessment system was developed by the SIGMA1 
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programme, which is funded mainly by the EU PHARE programme, at the request of 
the European Commission. The development and application of this assessment 
system is the latest step in the still ongoing process of defining an ‘administrative 
acquis’, which could eventually lead to the definition of some form of minimum 
standard for administrations of EU member states. 
 
The process of defining administrative capacity requirements could well have 
significance beyond the current enlargement process. For this reason alone it is an 
important issue in the ongoing debate on what kind of European Union will be 
able to deal with the accession of ten to twelve highly diverse new member states. 
At the same time, however, it is important to stress the special nature of the 
process of administrative development in Central and Eastern European states. 
The transformation of administrative systems, which were a key instrument of 
suppression in the hands of politicians under the former regime (Verheijen 1995), 
into professional and reliable administrations ready to function in the complex 
politico-administrative system of the EU is a daunting task. In this respect the 
possible points of comparison with earlier enlargement processes are rather 
limited. The administrations of Spain, Portugal and Greece, states which had also 
gone through a transition to democracy just before joining the EU, were of a very 
different nature. Even though the administrations of Spain, Portugal and Greece, 
like the administrations of the current candidate states, required modernisation at 
the time of membership, they did not carry a similar burden of having been a key 
instrument of suppression under the previous regime (Verheijen 1995). Still, the 
problems these states faced after joining the European Union, in terms of 
administrative capacities, were considerable and their response to these problems 
was diverse. Whereas EU membership was a catalyst for administrative reform in 
Spain and, even more so, in Portugal immediately after accession, the Greek 
response to EU membership, in terms of administrative modernisation, was for a 
long time inadequate. Only during the last few years has a concerted effort been 
made to bring the Greek administration in line with EU requirements. It is 
important to ensure that the response to EU membership in the current candidate 
states will bear similarity to the Spanish and Portuguese cases, rather than to the 
Greek case. In this respect it is imperative for the EU and the member states to 
learn from this earlier experience and apply the right set of incentives to ensure 
that membership will be a catalyst for administrative modernisation in the states 
of Central and Eastern Europe. Unfortunately little research is available that could 
explain the difference in response to EU membership in terms of administrative 
modernisation between Portugal and Spain on the one hand and Greece on the 
other. A further reflection on this issue would be a useful step in defining an 
appropriate policy to stimulate administrative development in the current 
candidate states. 
 
However, it is important to stress the specific background of the current candidate 
states in terms of administrative history, which certainly puts them in a more diffi-
cult position than Spain, Portugal and Greece at the time of their accession.  
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In view of this, even if the current candidate states make the same effort in 
administrative modernisation as Portugal and Spain, this might still not be 
sufficient to bring their capacities to the required level. One should therefore 
consider the possibility that they will not have fully operational capacities to 
function in the EU after accession. Therefore, it is essential to consider possible 
options to enable the EU as a political system to deal with the impact of the 
‘Eastern Enlargement’. 
 
First, the incorporation of a large group of new member states with inadequate 
capacities to function effectively in the EU would put at risk a key principle under-
lying the EU policy-making system: the mutual confidence between member states 
in the capacities of each others institutions. This mutual confidence was stretched 
to the limit by the Southern enlargement in the 1980s, and whereas the three 
Southern European states have, by now, generally been able to gain the confidence 
of all other member states,2 one should remember that this process took some 
time and that these states joined a very different EU. It is not clear whether a 
system built on mutual confidence will be able to incorporate ten Central and 
Eastern European states, if these are perceived as having inadequate adminis-
trative capacities.  
 
Second, it would be important to take this line of reasoning one step further and 
address the question whether in any event the EU as a politico-administrative 
system can continue to function when some twelve or more new member states 
will join, irrespective of the new member states’ administrative capacities. The 
question of the division of labour in the EU politico-administrative system between 
the Commission and the member states should be reflected upon as soon as 
possible, in order to avoid a paralysis in the EU system after enlargement.  
 
In conclusion, three key issues have been raised in this introduction: 
• the problem of defining administrative capacity requirements for EU 
membership and the risk of neglecting them as a result of the current EU focus 
on sectoral requirements; 
• the potential problems faced by Central and Eastern European states in 
meeting these requirements; 
• the need to reflect on ways to address the consequences of enlargement for 
the EU as a political and administrative system. 
 
Taking into account these three issues, this study is divided in three core sections. 
The first section focuses on the definition of administrative capacities for states to 
function effectively in the EU. The discussion in this study will concentrate on the 
ongoing process of defining horizontal administrative capacities and the extent to 
which this will lead to the creation of an ‘administrative acquis’. 
 
The second section assesses the extent to which horizontal administrative capacity 
requirements are currently met by the administrations of the candidate states. The 
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discussion in this section will focus on the development of civil service systems, 
the creation of training capacities and the process of restructuring state adminis-
tration, including the development of modern accountability systems. The section 
will include an analysis of factors that influence the process of creating profes-
sional and reliable administrations. 
 
The final section will review possible measures that could be taken to allow the EU 
as a political system to cope with the consequences of taking in new member states 
which might not, at the time of entry, fully meet administrative capacity require-
ments.  
 
This study is based on material drawn from academic research on administrative 
capacity development in Central and Eastern Europe, publications from the 
European Commission, the World Bank, SIGMA and the inventory of higher 
education and training programmes, carried out by the European Public 
Administration Association (EPAN) and the Network of Institutes and Schools of 
Public Administration in Central and Eastern Europe (NISPAcee).3 




1  Support for the Improvement of Governance and Management in Central and 
Eastern Europe, funded mainly by EU PHARE and implemented by the OECD. 
2  With the possible exception of Greece, but confidence in Greek capacities to 
function in the EU has increased significantly in the last few years. 
3  Funded by the EU SOCRATES programme and the Local and Government and 
Public Service Initiative under the Open Society Institute, Budapest, see 
bibliography for reference (Verheijen and Nemec). 
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2 ADMINISTRATIVE REQUIREMENTS FOR EU 
MEMBERSHIP; THE ONGOING DEBATE 
2.1 EU COMPETENCIES IN RELATION TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM 
OF (CANDIDATE) MEMBER STATES  
The direct influence of the EU on the administrative systems of its members is 
limited. In fact, the EU has almost no direct competencies in this area. The ad-
ministrative organisation of the member states is a matter of these states alone.1 
However, there are several sources of indirect influence of EU membership on 
member state administrations. 
 
First, member states are obliged, under article 5 of the Treaty of Rome, to take all 
the necessary measures to fulfil the obligations arising out of EU membership. This 
provision has serious implications for the administrative capacities of member 
states. Their administrations must have the capacity to ensure the ability of the 
state to participate in the EU decision-making process, to ensure the timely imple-
mentation of EU regulations, directives and decisions. In addition, they need to 
manage effectively the budgetary means provided by the EU under, for instance, 
the Common Agricultural Policy, the European Regional Development Fund, the 
European Social Fund and other EU policies and programs. Member states can be 
brought before the European Court of Justice if they do not meet their Treaty 
obligations2 and fines can be imposed on them. This indirect provision is the most 
important Treaty-derived legal basis for the EU to judge the administrative 
suitability of candidate states. 
 
The EU could also use a broad interpretation of Article 6 of the Treaty on European 
Union (Former Article F), which stipulates that the Union respects the funda-
mental rights, as warranted by the European Convention on the Safeguard of 
Human Rights. This obviously applies only if member states agree to use this pro-
vision between themselves. This provision has more serious potential implications 
for candidate states. At least in theory, a state cannot join the European Union that 
is unable to guarantee that in its interactions with citizens its administration acts 
consistently on the basis of the principles set out in this Convention.  
 
As a last point, regardless of the limited direct influence of the EU on the develop-
ment of the public administration of its member states, it has often been argued 
that the long term co-operation of states inside the political system of the EU has 
led to a certain approximation in the way their administrative systems operate. 
This long term intensive co-operation inside a political system has created what 
Fournier calls a ‘European Administrative Space’ (Fournier 1998). New member 
states must be able to function effectively inside this European Administrative 
Space. 
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2.2 BRIEF REVIEW OF THE EXPERIENCE OF EARLIER ENLARGEMENTS 
The next question of relevance is to what extent the European Union in the past 
used administrative capacities as a criterion in decisions on whether or not to 
accept candidate states. The answer to this question is rather straightforward; in 
earlier enlargements the EU did not devote significant attention to administrative 
capacities as a membership criterion. Certainly doubts could have been cast upon 
the adequacy of the administrative capacities of Greece, Spain and Portugal. These 
doubts are even valid if one takes into account that the Community these states 
joined was a very different, less complex and developed organisation when 
compared to the present European Union.3 In Cold War Europe, however, the 
stabilisation of the new democratic systems of government in these states was 
considered more important than their real ability to function in the European 
Communities. 
 
During the latest round of enlargement, which in 1995 brought Austria, Finland 
and Sweden into the EU, no questions were raised regarding their administrative 
capacities. The administrative ability to operate in the EU was not a real issue in 
the membership negotiations with these states, which traditionally have well-
developed administrative systems. Furthermore, these states had previously been 
part of the European Economic Area, and therefore had at least a partial experi-
ence of working inside the EU political system. It should be noted, however, that 
even the states with advanced administrative systems experienced certain pro-
blems in adapting their administrative systems to full participation in all aspects of 
the EU system. In the Swedish case these problems were mainly related to Swedish 
participation in the ‘upstream’ part of the European policy process;4 to a lesser 
degree this applied to Austria as well. The Austrian system also faced problems in 
the implementation of directives, as this required the involvement of the Länder. 
These problems were addressed through the inclusion of a mechanism which 
allowed the federal government to ‘take over’ the responsibilities of the states in 
implementing EU policies if they were not able to meet their obligations. 
 
 
2.3 THE SITUATION FOR THE CURRENT CANDIDATE STATES 
The candidate states face a very different situation when compared to the states 
which joined the EU in the previous rounds of enlargement. Administrative 
capacities have become an increasingly important issue for the EU, not only in 
relation to the enlargement with the states of Central and Eastern Europe, but also 
for the accession process of other candidate states, such as Cyprus, Malta and 
Turkey.5 A combination of factors caused this change in approach. 
 
A first factor is the rapid progress in the development of the EU after the so-called 
first (Greece) and second (Spain and Portugal) Mediterranean enlargements. The 
second Mediterranean enlargement led to a revision of the Treaties of the Euro-
ADMINISTRATIVE REQUIREMENTS FOR EU MEMBERSHIP; THE ONGOING DEBATE 
15
pean Communities, culminating in the Single European Act adopted in 1986. The 
Single European Act helped to break the decision-making deadlock, which had 
virtually paralysed the European Communities for almost two decades, and 
created the conditions for the completion of the Internal Market. The completion 
of the Internal Market, in turn, made adequate administrative capacities so as to 
be able to function in the EU into an important requirement; too wide a divergence 
in administrative capacities between member states to transpose and effectively 
implement EU legislation could lead to serious distortions in the functioning of the 
Internal Market. 
 
A second factor which can help to explain the increased interest in adequate ad-
ministrative capacities as an EU membership requirement is the change in attitude 
in the European Commission brought about by the change in Commission presi-
dent and the increasing ‘peer pressure’ exerted by member states on one another. 
The appointment of Jacques Santer as Commission president in 1995 led to the 
European Commission devoting more attention to the ‘performance’ of the EU as a 
political system, a trend which is likely to continue under the Prodi Commission. 
The regular publication of league tables of member states, listing the extent to 
which they meet their membership obligations, has exposed significant gaps in 
‘performance’ of member state administrations. Statements of Member States 
which generally perform well accompanied Santer’s actions in this area. These 
states, the UK in particular, have increasingly started to demand publicly that the 
under-performers clean up their act, driven by entrepreneurs who feel that they 
are subject to unfair competition from companies in states which generally lag 
behind in implementing EU decisions. 
 
Finally, the experience of the EU in working with the candidate states has raised 
questions about the level of their administrative capacities. The disbursement and 
absorption problems the main assistance program of the EU, the PHARE program,6 
has faced, as well as the perceived limited progress in the development of new ad-
ministrative systems in Central and Eastern European states, have led both EU 
officials and the member states to raise questions about the administrative pre-
paredness of this group of candidate states. 
 
 
2.4 FORMAL ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITY REQUIREMENTS FOR 
FUNCTIONING EFFECTIVELY IN THE EU 
The European Union explicitly defined its membership criteria for the first time at 
the Copenhagen European Council in June 1993. Initially, these criteria did not 
include a clear reference to administrative capacity requirements. The main 
criteria imposed on candidate states in terms of their internal readiness7 to join 
the EU can be summarised as the development of democratic systems of gover-
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nance, the creation of a working market economy and a proven capacity to absorb 
and apply the acquis communautaire.  
 
The first more explicit indication that general administrative capacities were 
considered to be an important issue in the enlargement process was provided by 
the references made to administrative capacities in the ‘White Paper on the Pre-
paration of the Associated Countries of Central and Eastern Europe for Integration 
into the Internal Market of the Union’. The White Paper makes extensive reference 
to sectoral administrative requirements, while making more limited statements on 
the necessary ‘horizontal’ capacities required to function in the EU.8 The conclu-
sions of the Madrid European Council, in December 1995, for the first time men-
tioned adequate administrative capacities as an explicit criterion for membership, 
without, however, addressing the issue in more detail.  
 
The first time administrative capacity was used as a criterion in its own right was 
in the Commission Opinions, issued in July 1997. In these opinions references 
were not only made to administrative capacities to deal with the absorption of 
specific elements of the acquis communautaire, but also to the need to develop 
general administrative capacities. Furthermore, the opinions showed the contours 
of what the European Commission considers to be an adequate administrative 
system. The criteria were developed further in the Commission Regular Reports on 
Progress, published in November 1998.  
 
References to administrative capacities can be found in the Opinions and Progress 
Reports under the section on the executive in the chapter on political criteria and 
in the section on ‘Administrative Capacity to Apply the Acquis’. Even though 
actually the latter section largely is a sectoral evaluation of administrative capaci-
ties in crucial policy areas, it also makes reference to general administrative 
capacities.  
 
The Opinions and Progress reports, even though often merely implicit in their 
references to general administrative development, until recently provided the best 
insight in what the EU requires of candidate states in terms of the civil service 
system. The main issues referred to in the Opinions and Progress reports in rela-
tion to the general quality of the public administration include: 
• the development of an impartial and professional administration (based on a 
civil service law); 
• the development of a training system; 
• adequate policy development and policy co-ordination capacities; 
• an effective accountability system (with particular emphasis on the system of 
Internal and External Financial Control); 
• the extent to which special structures and procedures have been put in place 
to manage EU affairs. 
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Another question that was raised in several of the Opinions is whether states had 
adopted an administrative reform strategy to deal with deficiencies identified in 
the Opinions. Other documents prepared by the European Commission, for in-
stance the Accession Partnerships and the conclusions of the Cardiff European 
Council, as well as statements from Commission officials, generally affirm the 
above direction.  
 
It is, however, important to consider these criteria in the right perspective. It 
seems inconceivable that a state could be refused entry into the EU on the basis of 
the administrative capacity requirements alone. Furthermore, the fact that the 
Commission decided to dedicate its pre-accession assistance to ‘institution buil-
ding’9 almost exclusively to sectoral assistance, indicates that the main priority of 
the European Commission remains the readiness of the candidate states to imple-
ment the acquis communautaire in sectoral areas.  
 
In addition to the necessity of meeting the requirements of the EU, candidate states 
also have a self-interest in trying to develop an effective administration. Expe-
rience from previous enlargements has shown that states which do not set up 
effective structures and procedures for the management of EU policy-making 
(defining national positions on Commission proposals, taking policy initiatives in 
Second and Third Pillar areas, managing the presidency etc.) tend to ‘lose out’ in 
the policy process and face difficulties in meeting membership obligations.  
 
 
2.5 SIGMA BASELINES: A NEW STEP IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
ASSESSMENT CRITERIA 
The preparation of the Commission Progress Reports in 1999 was, as far as ad-
ministrative capacity assessment is concerned, based on inputs provided by a new 
assessment tool: the SIGMA baseline assessment. This system is a response to the 
lack of specificity in horizontal administrative capacity assessment, combined with 
the perceived lack of accuracy by candidate states of previous assessments. The 
SIGMA programme, which operates under the OECD Public Management Service 
(PUMA) and is funded mainly by the EU PHARE programme, has been one of the 
main ‘tools’ of the European Commission in promoting capacity development in 
public administration in Central and Eastern Europe, as well as a technical assis-
tance service to the candidate states. The unique position of the programme, often 
serving as an intermediary between the Commission and the candidate states, was 
used to develop an assessment system which would provide the Commission with 
better information while at the same time providing candidate states with assuran-
ces that assessments would be fair and objective. The ‘test’ of this assessment tool 
in the preparation of the 1999 Progress Reports constitutes a major step forward 
in the definition of minimum standards for horizontal administrative capacities 
required to function effectively in the EU’s politico-administrative system. 
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Table 1 Baseline issues for horizontal administrative capacity assessment10 
Assessment element Baseline issues 
Policy-Making and 
Co-ordination 
Coherence of the policy-making framework 
Inter-ministerial consultation mechanisms 
Agenda Planning 
Dispute resolution mechanisms 
Central co-ordination capacity 
General strategic capacity 
Co-ordination of EU affairs 
Involvement of the Council of Ministers in budget decisions 
Impact assessment 
Civil Service Legal status of civil servants 
Legality, responsibility and accountability of public servants 
Impartiality and integrity of public servants 
Efficiency in management of public servants and in control of staffing 
Professionalism and stability of public servants 




Inclusion of sound budgeting principles in the Constitution, Organic 
Budget Law and/or related laws 
Balance between executive and legislative power 
Exact definition of the scope of the State Budget and efficient 
arrangements for transfers to extra-budgetary funds 
Medium term expenditure framework 
A logical, sequential and transparent Budget process, set out in clearly 
defined rules 
Effective arrangements for the Budget management of Public 
Investments 
Effective monitoring mechanisms for budget implementation 
Common classification for accounting and reporting, compatible with 
concepts related to the disbursement of EU funds 
Capacities for upgrading the Public Expenditure Management system 
Public Procurement Inclusion of a defined set of principles in public procurement  
legislation 
Clear legal basis and adequate capacities for the central procurement 
organisation 
Effective mechanisms of procurement implementation and training 
Presence of control and complaints review procedures 
Capacity for upgrading the Public Procurement system 
Internal Financial 
Control 
A coherent and comprehensive statutory base defining the systems, 
principles and functioning of financial control 
Presence of management control systems and procedures 
Presence of a functionally independent internal audit/inspectorate 
mechanism 
Presence of systems to prevent and take actions against irregularities 
and to enable recovery of damages 
Capacity to upgrade financial control systems 
External Audit Statutory authority for the SAI to audit all public and statutory funds 
and resources, including EU funds 
Meeting requirements set out in INTOSAI auditing standards  
Necessary operational and functional independence 
Reporting: regularity, fairness, timeliness, proper counterpart in the 
parliament 
Awareness of EU accession process requirements 
Capacity to upgrade quality of external audit 
ADMINISTRATIVE REQUIREMENTS FOR EU MEMBERSHIP; THE ONGOING DEBATE 
19
The baseline assessment covers six core areas: 
1 Policy-making and co-ordination machinery; 
2 Civil Service; 
3 Financial management; 
4 Public Procurement; 
5 Internal Financial Control; 
6 External Audit. 
In each of these six areas minimum standards, ‘baselines’, have been developed in 
consultation with the EU and, in many areas, also with the involvement of the 
candidate states. The assessment uses a rating scale ranging from ‘standard 
achieved’ to ‘standard unlikely to be achieved under present arrangements’.11 
Table 1 presents a brief review of the main issues included in the baseline 
assessment. 
 
A comparison of the administrative capacity chapters in the 1999 Regular Reports 
on Progress and the SIGMA baseline assessment reports reveals that the baseline 
assessment has clearly been the basis for the administrative capacity assessment. 
In several country reports the text of the assessment summaries and the text of the 
Regular Reports on Progress are virtually the same. It is likely that the baseline 
assessment tool will be used in future preparations on Regular Reports on 
Progress, thus finally creating a well-defined tool for administrative capacity 




The preparation of the 1999 Regular Reports on Progress12 on EU enlargement was 
based on inputs provided by a new assessment system for horizontal administra-
tive capacities. The development of this assessment mechanism marks the final 
stage in the process of definiting horizontal administrative capacity requirements 
for EU membership. The elaboration of administrative capacity requirements, in 
particular horizontal capacities, has been one of the more difficult elements in the 
process of developing EU membership criteria, mainly due to the lack of precedents 
in this area. 
 
Even though the membership requirements on horizontal administrative capac-
ities have become increasingly clear over the last years, a number of questions still 
remain regarding the way these criteria will be used and the manner in which they 
will affect the process of administrative development in the candidate states.  
 
The first question is how the Commission’s focus on sectoral administrative capac-
ities will affect horizontal administrative capacity development in candidate states. 
This would depend to some degree on the way in which the Commission will deal 
with the presentation and explanation of the administrative requirements in the 
yearly Progress Reports. In addition, it will depend on whether there will continue 
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to be some degree of assistance in the area of horizontal capacity development, in 
addition to sectoral Institution Building support.13 The second question is to what 
degree the candidate states have really made progress in the development of hori-
zontal administrative capacities, beyond declarations of intent and the adoption of 
legislation. A third question is what strategies could be employed to stimulate 
further progress in administrative development in the candidate states. Finally, it 
is important to reflect on how the EU as a political system could cope with conse-
quences of the possible accession of a group of states which might not have com-
pleted the development of modern systems of public administration. 
ADMINISTRATIVE REQUIREMENTS FOR EU MEMBERSHIP; THE ONGOING DEBATE 
NOTES 
1  As an illustration of the importance member states attach to regarding ad-
ministrative organisation as an internal issue, one of the basic principles on 
with European Integration is based, freedom of movement of workers and 
non-discrimination of workers from other member states, does not fully apply 
to the public administration. Initially, employment in the public administra-
tion was fully exempted from the provisions guaranteeing the freedom of 
movement of workers and non-discrimination, but following a European 
Court of Justice ruling of 17 December 1980 certain limitations have been 
imposed on this exemption (see Ziller 1998, for an in-depth review of this 
issue).  
2  Under article 169 of the Treaty. 
3  The Opinion of the European Commission on the membership application of 
Greece actually advised against opening membership negotiations, based on 
doubts as to whether Greece would be able to take on the obligations of 
membership. However, the Council still decided to open membership 
negotiations which led to Greece joining the EU on 1 January 1981. 
4  The Swedish policy-making tradition was ill-adapted to the requirements of 
the EU policy process, which mostly involve fast reaction to Commission 
proposals and the ability to detect the most appropriate point for influence in 
the process. 
5  Accession negotiations with Cyprus and Malta are proceeding in parallel to the 
negotiation process involving the Central and Eastern European candidate 
states. Doubts about administrative capacities were raised in the Commission 
Opinions on both Malta and Cyprus but are deemed to be have been addressed 
sufficiently by Cyprus. It is highly likely that administrative capacity require-
ments will also be an important issue in future negotiations with Turkey. 
6  It should be noted that these are considered due as much to management 
deficiencies in the Commission as to a lack of absorption capacities in the 
candidate states. Problems with the implementation of Phare programmes in 
the areas of Public Administration and European Integration/Law Approxi-
mation are well documented in the evaluation reports commissioned by the 
Joint Relex Service of the European Commission. Both evaluation reports 
were published in 1999 (http://www.europa.int/)  
7  A criterion which does not depend on the readiness of the candidates them-
selves is the EU’s internal capacity to keep up the momentum of European 
Integration in an enlarged European Union, which is often called the ‘catch 22’ 
provision.  
8  The White Paper refers to the need for the associated countries to adapt their 
administrative machinery and their societies to the conditions necessary to 
make harmonised legislation work 
9  The meaning of ‘institution building’ in Commission-speak will be discussed 
in more detail later on. The use of this term in this context relates to the devel-
opment of institutions, institutional arrangements, legislation and procedures 
to implement the acquis communautaire in the EU candidate states from 
central and Eastern Europe. 
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10  Based on the SIGMA Baseline assessments, as received from the governments of 
four candidate states 
11  The full rating scale is: 
• Standard achieved 
• Standard substantially achieved 
• Standard only partially achieved 
• Standard not yet achieved but progress being made 
• Standard not yet achieved 
• Standard unlikely to be achieved in the medium term 
• Standard unlikely to be achieved under present arrangements 
12  Hereafter: Progress Reports 
13  In the first year the new PHARE approach to the candidate states was 
operational, funds were allocated almost exclusively to sectoral capacity 
building projects, while under the 1999 PHARE allocation some (limited) 
allocations for horizontal institutional development (in particular the 
development of training institutions) were made. On first evidence this trend 
appears to continue in the PHARE 2000 programming, with significant 
horizontal institution building projects being considered in particular in 
Slovakia and Latvia. 
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3 FULFILLING THE REQUIREMENTS FOR  
FUNCTIONING IN THE EU 
This section provides a comparative review of the development of new systems in 
public administration in the candidate states. First a brief review will be given of 
the state of development of administrative systems as reflected in academic 
literature and the Opinions and Progress Reports of the European Commission. 
There is a strong contrast between frequent reform announcements and state-
ments of intent by Central and Eastern European governments and the perceived 
lack of progress in this area reflected in Commission Opinions and Progress 
Reports as well as in academic literature. 
 
The section will introduce a comparative analysis of trends in the development of 
three key areas of administrative reform. This analysis serves to examine to what 
degree the perception of lack of progress is correct, how the problems Central and 
Eastern European states have experienced can be explained, and what alternative 
strategies might be available to speed up the administrative development process.  
 
The three main areas of administrative development to be reviewed are the cre-
ation of new civil service systems (in particular the development and implemen-
tation of civil service legislation), the development of training capacities, and the 
reform of administrative structures and processes, including the creation of 
dedicated structures for the management of EU affairs.1 These three areas in the 
development of professional and reliable administrations are essential require-
ments for states to function effectively in the EU. Civil Service legislation and policy 
are crucial elements in the stabilisation, de-politicisation and professionalisation 
of the civil service; training is an important potential catalyst for change while the 
rationalisation of administrative structures and procedures is instrumental in 
creating a more effective and accountable administration. 
 
The development of new systems of local self-government will not be discussed in 
detail. The development of new systems of Local Self Government has been the 
main focus of attention in academic studies on public administration in Central 
and Eastern Europe (see for instance Coulson 1995 and Bennet 1994). However, 
whereas the importance of local self-governing structures for the development of 
democratic systems of governance is undeniable, it is of less direct relevance to the 
question of EU membership. Local governments have some important tasks in EU 
policy implementation, but these generally relate to sectoral policy areas, which 
are not the subject of this study. The involvement of local governments in 
decision-making is still very limited,2 though these have gained some influence 
through the creation of the Committee of the Regions and through the principle of 
partnership as developed within EU regional policy. 
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3.1 A WORLD OF CONTRAST: INCREASING REFORM ANNOUNCEMENTS 
– CONTINUING NEGATIVE ASSESSMENTS 
After the initial neglect of central government administration in the reform pro-
grammes of Central and Eastern European states, the last few years have seen a 
flurry of statements of intent by governments, often ‘translated’ into reform 
strategy documents and, to a lesser degree, in (draft) legislation. In Bulgaria, for 
instance, two administrative reform and development strategies have been adop-
ted in the last five years by different governments. All EU candidate states have 
adopted administrative reform strategies, often more than just one. 
 
Apart from the adoption of reform strategies, most Central and Eastern European 
states have worked actively on the development of legislation that should provide 
the basis for the development of new administrative systems at central govern-
ment level. However, if and when draft legislation is adopted, it is often not fully 
implemented; a new government often invalidates initiatives taken by its pre-
decessor. 
 
If one considers developments in administrative reform and development in 
Central and Eastern Europe at face value, one can notice an increasing number of 
statements of intent by governments, the adoption of reform strategies, and a high 
level of legislative activity. Statements of intent have been made ever more fre-
quently since the EU explicitly defined an effective and efficient central adminis-
tration as one condition for membership. 
 
At the same time there are strong indicators that progress in horizontal adminis-
trative capacity development has been limited at best. The still sparse academic 
publications on public administration in Central and Eastern Europe continue to 
focus on the need to address some of the classical issues in public administration, 
such as structuring politico-administrative relations, creating a system of employ-
ment conditions which allows the civil service to attract and retain highly qualified 
staff, defining a new accountability system and developing management and 
policy-making capacities. A comparison of academic work on central government 
reform written early on in the transformation process (for instance, Hesse 1993) 
with more recent publications (Verheijen and Coombes 1998, Hesse 1998, 
Verheijen 1999) would lead one to conclude that little progress has been made in 
addressing these issues. A review of the last five issues of the proceedings of the 
Annual Conferences of the Network of Institutes and Schools of Public 
Administration in Central and Eastern Europe (NISPAcee) (Jabes and Vintar 1996; 
Jabes 1997, 1998, 1999 and Jabes and Caddy 2000) leads to a similar conclusion.3  
 
Another indicator of the limited progress in administrative reform in Central and 
Eastern Europe are the Commission Opinions and Progress Reports. The 1997 
Commission Opinions highlighted serious deficiencies in the administrative 
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systems of the candidate states (European Commission 1997 and Fournier 1998). 
Whereas the Opinions are, with some exceptions,4 (moderately) positive on the 
development of the overall institutional system, the central public administration 
is singled out as a weak link in this system. What is reflected in the Opinions, with 
few exceptions,5 are fragmented, politicised administrations, rife with allegations 
of corruption, underpaid staff, and a resulting high degree of staff turnover. Policy-
making capacities are evaluated as weak and the lack of personnel development 
strategies is frequently pointed out. 
 
The 1998 Commission Progress Reports again evaluated public administration 
capacities as weak in most of the candidate states, even in those states which 
belong to the first group of countries to negotiate their accession to the EU. 
Whereas proress in administrative development was reported for Latvia, Lithuania 
and Bulgaria, the pace of administrative development in Slovenia, Estonia and 
Romania was criticised strongly, while in the Czech Republic and Slovakia the 
reform of the central administration in many ways still had to be started. The only 
state that obtained a good evaluation across the board was Hungary. The 1999 
Progress Reports continued to signal insufficient progress in administrative 
capacity development, with performance in the majority of candidate states 
assessed as mixed at best. As in the 1998 Progress Reports the assessment of 
Hungary was the most positive while the assessment of Romania clearly was the 
most negative, SIGMA baseline criteria not being met in the overwhelming majority 
of the assessment areas. 
 
Overall the 1998 and 1999 Progress reports were significantly more harsh than the 
Opinions in the judgement on administrative capacity development. This leads to 
the conclusion that the trend in administrative development is a negative rather 
than a positive one. The picture emerging from a review of academic literature on 
public administration reform in Central and Eastern Europe and the Commission 
Opinions and Progress Reports is thus in stark contrast to the flurry of reform 
announcements over the last years.  
 
Some further indicators point to a lack of progress in administrative development. 
The limited information available on public opinion towards central government 
administration shows continuing high levels of citizens’ distrust in central admi-
nistrations.6 Levels of confidence in local self-governing authorities are much 
higher without exception. Furthermore, the low quality of administrations is 
considered an important explanatory factor for the economic downturns and crises 
that several Central and Eastern European states experienced in recent years. This 
holds in particular for Bulgaria, where failure and corruption in the administration 
were considered a major factor in the severe economic crisis of 1996-1997 
(Dimitrova and Verheijen 1998), for Romania (International IDEA 1997) and also 
for the Czech Republic, where the economic downturn of 1997-1998 gave rise to a 
debate on the need for administrative reform, an issue which had been neglected 
until that time (see Vidlakova in Jabes 1999).  
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The picture that emerges of a consistent failure of the candidate states to develop 
effective, efficient and accountable central administrative structures raises two 
related questions:  
1 have reforms really failed to produce significant results and, 
2 if so, what are the causes for this failure?  
The conclusions of this analysis will be used to determine alternative ways in 
which administrative development could be stimulated. 
 
 
3.2 A COMPARATIVE INVENTORY OF ADMINISTRATIVE DEVELOPMENT 
The following comparative inventory of the development of the legislative frame-
work for the operation of the civil service, the development of training structures 
and the re-structuring of central administrations (including the development of 
dedicated structures for the management of EU affairs), will examine the degree of 
real divergence between statements of intent and progress made in reality.  
 
 
3.2.1 CREATING A PROFESSIONAL AND RELIABLE CIVIL SERVICE 
In the early stage of the development of new systems of central administration in 
Central and Eastern Europe, the adoption of civil service legislation was generally 
considered the basic condition. Civil service laws were considered the main reform 
tool for addressing problems such as politicisation, fragmentation and instability. 
Civil service laws have now been adopted in six out of ten EU candidate states. In 
states where no civil service law is yet in place, they generally are in the final phase 
of adoption. Interestingly, the Czech Republic and Slovakia are the two states 
which still lag behind furthest in the process of adopting civil service laws. In both 
states the process of drafting a civil service law was re-launched in 1998 after 
general elections had taken place. 
 
Among the three elements of reform discussed in this section, the drafting and 
adoption of civil service legislation is the element in which most progress has been 
made. However, in many cases the adoption of the civil service law seems to have 
become an objective in itself, while this should have been a mere first step in the 
creation of a civil service (development) policy. Civil service laws have often been 
only partially implemented, if at all. In Poland, Latvia and Lithuania a process of 
fundamental revision was started within two years after the adoption of the civil 
service laws, in all three states leading to the creation of a completely new law.7 
Thus, it should not come as a surprise that the impact of the adoption of civil 
service laws on the actual functioning of the administration has so far been 
limited. 
 
Hungary, which has ‘outperformed’ the other candidate states in progress on 
administrative capacity development, adopted a Civil Service Law as early as 1992. 
FULFILLING THE REQUIREMENTS FOR FUNCTIONING IN THE EU 
27
However, the development of a well-balanced recruitment and promotion system 
still has not been completed (György in Verheijen 1999). The process of creating a 
permanent Civil Service was hampered by the attitude of the incoming 
government in Spring 1998, which showed a reluctance to work with the civil 
servants in office.8 Furthermore politicians made extensive use of loopholes in the 
law, such as the fact that the civil service law does not make it mandatory to 
publicly advertise vacancies. Hungary, however, constitutes the most positive 
example of administrative stabilisation. Staff turnover has been reduced signifi-
cantly since the adoption of the civil service law (György in Verheijen 1999). The 
question that remains, and on which there is an ongoing debate in Hungary, is 
how the impact of the civil service law can be taken beyond stabilisation, as seven 
years after having adopted the law there still is no recognisable civil service policy. 
 
In Poland the incoming government halted in autumn 1997 the implementation of 
the civil service law that had been adopted in 1996. After a period of reflection, the 
new government decided to start working on the adoption of a new law, rather 
than working with the law adopted by the previous government. Again the reluc-
tance of the incoming government to work with civil servants in office, and in this 
case also to work with management structures created and staffed by the previous 
government, seems to have been the main reason behind the decision to stop the 
implementation of the law. It is interesting to note that Poland was the only state 
in the region to have a civil service law under the previous regime. Thus, it now has 
a legal regime for the civil service, which consists of the old 1982 law and imple-
mented elements of the new civil service law, mostly applying to higher level civil 
servants. A new civil service law has been adopted to replace the law that had been 
adopted in 1996. 
 
Civil service laws were adopted in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania within a relatively 
short time span in 1994-1995. Even though in all three cases the laws were based 
on a continental European tradition, the impact of civil service legislation has been 
very different from case to case. In Latvia and Lithuania the adopted civil service 
laws never were fully implemented. They have been subject to an ongoing revision 
process, as the adopted laws were considered inadequate for various reasons.  
 
In Latvia the implementation of the civil service law, adopted in 1994, was initially 
combined with a comprehensive training and re-training programme,9 which was 
expected to provide the basis for a coherent, professional administration. 
However, the implementation of the law was stopped in 1997, after a change of 
government, and the training programme was abandoned, mainly for budgetary 
reasons. Since then the process of civil service development in Latvia has stag-
nated. The process of revising the civil service law, which started late 1997, still has 
not been completed, though a new civil service law is expected to be adopted in 
2000. The prolonged ‘transition’ between the old legal framework governing civil 
service employment conditions and the new law, in process of adoption, has 
created a highly opaque system of employment conditions for civil servants, in 
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particular in relation to remuneration. Senior officials can obtain significant 
bonuses on the basis of unpublished ‘management contracts’, a development 
which has led to increased suspicion of the state administration among citizens. 
Many institutions have opted to leave the civil service, in order to improve em-
ployment conditions for their staff, thus creating unclear accountability relations 
in the administration. The current impasse in the development of a legal frame-
work for civil service development certainly does not contribute to the establish-
ment of a stable and professional civil service, which successive governments have 
claimed they want to create.   
 
In Lithuania the civil service law, the Law on Officials, was adopted in 1995. The 
law has been subject to revision and re-consideration. Here the emphasis was on 
the re-definition of certain elements of the civil service law, in particular of the 
dividing line between political and career civil servants. This dividing line had not 
been well-defined in the 1995 law, leading to mass dismissals after the change in 
the parliamentary majority in 1996, carried out within the framework of the law on 
officials.10 Furthermore, there was a perceived lack of balance between the rights 
and obligations of officials, making civil service positions unattractive and uncom-
petitive. The general concept underlying the Lithuanian administration continues 
to be based on the German and Spanish civil service model.11 The new Lithuanian 
Civil Service Law was adopted in July 1999 and its implementation, which is 
scheduled to take until 2003, has only just started. The new law clarifies the rela-
tions between career civil servants and political appointees and sets out transpar-
ent criteria for recruitment and career advancement. In addition, it has adopted a 
very wide definition of ‘civil service’, in contrast to the predominant policy direc-
tion in, for instance, Latvia. The Lithuanian Civil Service Law includes, for in-
stance, local government officials under the civil service law. 
 
In Estonia the civil service law, adopted in 1995, entered into force in January 
1996. Unlike the other two Baltic States, the Estonian civil service law has been 
implemented. However, since the implementation of the civil service law was not 
enshrined in a clear public administration reform concept (the development of 
which was completed only in 1998), the overall impact of the law in terms of the 
development of a professional administration has remained limited here too.  
 
The Bulgarian Civil Service law was adopted in June 1999. As Bulgaria suffered 
from one of the highest rates of turnover in the administration (Verheijen 1999), 
this is a potentially significant step forward. However, much will depend on the 
degree to which the law will be fully implemented. The civil service law will enter 
into force in January 2000 and its implementation is likely to be completed before 
the next general elections, which are scheduled for early 2001. If a change of 
government takes place, this would obviously constitute a serious test for the 
durability of the new law. 
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In the other EU candidate states (Czech Republic, Romania, Slovenia and Slovakia) 
civil service laws have not been adopted yet. All these states still lack a basic legal 
framework for the development of Human Resource Management in the central 
administration, which is a basic requirement for the development of a profes-
sional, stable and impartial administration. 
 
The positive picture one could have when considering the development of civil 
service legislation in an increasing number of Central and Eastern European states 
on face value becomes much more mixed when this issue is examined more in-
depth. Civil service laws have seldom been the expected catalysts for the stabili-
sation, de-politicisation and professionalisation of the central administration. 
Rather than being a starting point for the development of civil service policies, the 
adoption of laws has become an objective in itself. Apart from Hungary, none of 
the candidate states has come close to the development of a civil service policy, in 
addition to the necessary legal framework. 
 
 
3.2.2 DEVELOPING TRAINING SYSTEMS 
Training can play an important role in bringing about administrative change.  
A combination of the introduction of newly trained recruits in an ‘old’ adminis-
tration, together with the re-training of staff already employed, if rightly applied, 
can be a powerful administrative reform tool.  
 
Training can also make a contribution to the development of a coherent adminis-
tration. Joint pre- or post-entry training of new recruits can help creating a sense 
of community among new civil servants. This sense of community could play a role 
in reducing the still universally high degree of fragmentation in Central and 
Eastern European administrations. Joint training of top level officials can have a 
similar effect.  
 
However, the development of training systems has for a long time been ignored or 
neglected by the candidate states. In fact, the development of new training struc-
tures can be considered one of the main elements of failure in the development of 
new administrations. A large number of training schools and institutes have been 
established, but most of these are involved in local government training or in 
university type public administration education (see, for instance, Verheijen and 
Nemec 2000).  
 
At the same time there is a striking lack of training institutions and programmes 
that could provide training as a part of government human resource policy. The 
involvement of training institutions in in-service training has been ad hoc and on 
request, while few states have schools which are recognised by the government as 
providers of candidate civil servants. The recent creation of new state training 
institutions in Lithuania and Bulgaria might signal a long overdue change in trend.  
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In the early years of the transition, attempts were made to develop new govern-
ment training institutions in a number of Central and Eastern European states. 
The National School of Public Administration in Poland, established in 1991, is one 
of the few remaining examples of this ‘first generation’ of initiatives. The concept 
of the Polish school was based on the assumption that by inserting highly qualified 
graduates in top positions in the administration, it would be possible to create a 
‘multiplier effect’ and bring about rapid change. The high level training of young 
promising staff would have to be accompanied by in-service training for those 
already in the administration to achieve the desired effect. However, even though 
the Polish school was created as an integrated element of the administration 
(based on the model of the French Ecôle Nationale d’Administration (ENA)), it has 
not fulfilled its potential, mainly due to the late start of the in-service training 
activities. At the same time, the Polish School of Public Administration is the only 
remaining institution which at least to some degree fulfils the function it was 
created for. Even though the school has functioned better under some govern-
ments than under others, its graduates are guaranteed a position in the adminis-
tration and have the obligation to work for the administration for a defined 
number of years. 
 
A similar initiative was taken in Slovakia in 1992, when a high level pre-service 
training programme was started at a government funded institution, Academia 
Istropolitana. The School of Public Administration had a government-approved 
programme and government funded grants for those who gained entry. The Natio-
nal School of Political Science and Public Administration in Romania, which was 
created in 1991, was based on the same model. The Romanian school was progres-
sively marginalised after the change of government in 1996 and the Slovak school 
was closed down (for political reasons) by the government in 1997. The develop-
ment of training structures was thus a highly politicised process.  
 
The idea of creating a professional school of public administration, able to serve 
any government, has obviously not yet taken hold among Central and Eastern 
European politicians. At the same time new university programmes in Public 
Administration, which have been created in all candidate states, have not yet been 
able to develop sufficient links with government institutions. In the long term, 
however, their output of graduates could make a difference to the quality of 
candidates for civil service positions.  
 
The fate of government-run or funded in-service training institutions has been 
slightly more positive. The Latvian School of Public Administration in particular 
was given a core role in the training of civil service candidates.12 However, when 
the implementation of the civil service law was halted by the government in 1997, 
the role of training in the civil service development process was reduced signifi-
cantly. Still, the Latvian school is one of the best examples of an integrated in-
service training institution in Central and Eastern Europe, even though one could 
argue the school actually functioned as a kind of pre-entry training institution. In 
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some other states training institutions have also been established. In Estonia 
government and semi-government in-service training institutions are among the 
most important providers of in-service training. In Bulgaria, Lithuania and 
Slovenia recently established state training institutions are expected to play a 
significant role in the preparation of national administrations for EU membership.  
 
A general problem with all the above mentioned training institutions is that very 
often they are little more than managers of training programmes. They do not 
actually have a core body of permanent trainers in their staff. Furthermore, they 
lack the capacities to carry out reliable analyses of training needs, often merely 
react to government and are dependent on foreign assistance for the provision of 
training programmes in key areas.  
 
The question arises why training has been neglected as a reform tool. There are 
three related possible reasons for this.  
The first reason is financial constraints. The creation of government training 
schools requires a considerable investment, if a high quality institution is to be 
created. In times when basic needs in key areas such as health and education can 
hardly be met, it is understandable that governments have been reluctant to invest 
in the development of public administration training institutions, regardless of the 
potential long-term benefits that can be gained from such institutions. The cases of 
Bulgaria and Lithuania show, for instance, that once external funding is available 
for institutional development (in both cases under PHARE 1999 allocations), 
governments are much more likely to create training institutions. 
 
A second reason is that governments have generally been reluctant to use training 
as an element of reform programmes. The approach to public administration re-
form has been mostly legislative in nature, which is not surprising considering the 
prevailing legalistic tradition in many Central and Eastern European states. The 
adoption of legislation has been emphasised rather than the application of more 
complex reform tools like training. Whereas in many of the candidate states new 
training institutions in public administration have been created, these are rarely 
used as an integral part of the civil service development process, mainly due to a 
lack of state training policies. 
 
The generally negative experience with ‘imported’ training is a third reason for the 
reluctance to using training as a reform tool. ‘Imported’ training might have been 
useful in the early stages of the reform process, as an information and awareness 
raising tool, but in the current stage of development it is of much less value, unless 
it is tailor-made and aimed at the transfer of specific, job related skills (see also 
Hesse 1998). Since this has not happened so far, the availability of funded external 
training has in recent years been of little help to public administration reform. The 
inclination of foreign institutions to transfer national training models and pro-
grammes to Central and Eastern European states, without taking into account 
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differences in administrative tradition, has been a further factor in limiting the 
value of ‘imported’ training.  
 
For the three reasons discussed above the use of training as a reform tool has been 
limited. Only a sustained effort to support the development of local capacities 
might provide a solution to this problem. 
 
 
3.2.3 STRUCTURAL REFORM AND RE-DESIGNING THE POLICY PROCESS 
Even a high quality civil service can only function adequately if it is embedded in 
well-designed administrative structures and processes, including functioning 
horizontal and vertical co-ordination systems and a clear accountability system, to 
provide civil servants with the necessary freedom of action. This section includes 
an assessment of progress in the rationalisation of policy processes, the develop-
ment of new accountability systems and, finally, the creation of structures and 
processes for the management of EU affairs. 
 
Improving policy processes 
The re-definition of the role and position of ministries, their subordinated organi-
sations and the core executive unit13 in the administration is a crucial aspect of any 
administrative development process. This element is of particular importance in 
Central and Eastern European states, since the core executive units of the adminis-
tration used to ‘shadow’ line ministries under the previous regime and play a 
dominant role in the process of policy co-ordination. Policy processes were there-
fore ‘top heavy’ and based on co-ordination at the top. Core executive units also 
tended to (and in many cases still do) manage large numbers of subordinated 
institutions. Accountability lines were directed towards the leading political party. 
 
The reform of policy-making and implementation structures and systems is one of 
the most difficult elements of the administrative development process, even more 
so in the specific historical context in Central and Eastern Europe. Considering the 
information available on this issue (e.g. SIGMA Centre of Government profiles on 
twelve states)14, the policy-making and implementation processes still show many 
features of the previous systems: top heavy co-ordination, leaving little or no space 
for conflict resolution before issues reach the government, duplication of functions 
(especially in the legislative process) and a lack of clearly defined accountability 
structures. Even in new states, such as the Baltic States, the division of labour 
between ministries and the core executive unit in the policy process still shows 
some of the features of the former system.  
 
In few states attempts have been made to re-define the role of the different com-
ponents of the central administration in the policy process. Poland, for instance, 
carried out a substantial reform of the Council of Ministers’ administration, with 
the objective to create a small core Prime Minister’s Office, among others by 
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‘pushing down’ co-ordination tasks into the administration. In Hungary attempts 
have also been made to reduce the scope and tasks of the Prime Minister’s office 
and to strengthen policy development capacities simultaneously, giving the Prime 
Minister’s Office a more strategic focus. In general, however, the development of 
effective policy processes is an area in which the assessment of the candidate states 
in the SIGMA baseline assessments is possibly the most negative. 
 
For policy-making systems to start working more effectively a comprehensive re-
definition of the role of the different units in the administration and the relations 
between these units will be needed. Yet, only during the last two years initiatives 
have been taken in several states to adopt laws to regulate the role and function of 
the different institutions in the administration and to rationalise the way in which 
the administration works. For instance, in Bulgaria the Law on Public Adminis-
tration was adopted in 1998, which defines the type of institutions that can exist in 
the state administration, how these relate to one another and what the role and 
function of different types of institutions can be. In Lithuania a similar law was 
passed in June 1999 and in Latvia a new legal framework for the organisation of 
the state administration is under development. The adoption of such laws might 
signal a move in the direction of a rationalisation of the policy process in these 
states.  
 
The adoption of laws in this area, however, cannot be more than a mere first step. 
Implementation and enforcement is certain to hit on resistance of the generally 
all-powerful line ministries and there is as yet no case of a successfully completed 
structural reform of an administrative system in the region. Furthermore, there is 
little evidence at the current time of a decentralisation of responsibility inside the 
administration or of co-ordination being ‘pushed down’ to lower levels in the ad-
ministration. Policy-making procedures remain ‘top heavy’, with co-ordination 
concentrated at the core executive unit of government. Even if formally more co-
ordination structures are set up at the lower levels of the administration, this has 
often not led to real changes in policy-making practises.15  
 
A further point of importance is the development of impact assessment capacities 
at core executive units of government. At the current time legislation and policies 
are generally checked only on their compliance with the constitution and inter-
national legal requirements. The financial implications of adopted legislation are 
often assessed only in a general manner. The development of an integrated impact 
assessment system, even in a rudimentary form, is a key element of any decision-
making system regarding the sequencing of accession-related legislation and 
policies. In the absence of an impact assessment system, serious contradictions 
could arise between policies directed at meeting EU membership requirements on 
the one hand and sound policies to complete the economic transition. 
 
The development of a new legislative framework for the administration and the 
improvement of the quality of the policy processes, through improved co-ordina-
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tion and the development of impact assessment mechanisms, are elements of the 
administrative development process on which much work remains to be done. 
This is possibly the most difficult area of administrative reform, but one which has 
a high potential impact on the ability of the candidate states to function effectively 
in the EU.  
 
Accountability systems 
In its assessments of administrative capacities in the candidate states, the EU has 
placed much emphasis on the development of capacities for internal and external 
financial control, as one element of the creation of new accountability systems. 
Accountability systems are obviously a crucial element of capacity development in 
relation to EU membership, in particular since the overwhelming majority of EU 
policy implementation (and thus disbursement of funds) is controlled nationally.  
 
The development of internal financial control and external audit capacities has 
been strongly advocated and supported by the EU in recent years. Even though the 
creation of internal financial control systems has proven to be difficult in states 
with a high degree of ministerial autonomy, it is likely that with the conditionality 
imposed by the EU and the funds made available, these systems will eventually be 
put in place. 
 
In the context of this study, however, accountability systems are viewed in a 
broader perspective. The question posed here is whether there is a move towards 
the creation of modern, well-balanced accountability systems, including adminis-
trative, political, judicial and, if applicable, quasi-market accountability mecha-
nisms. The development of balanced accountability mechanisms is a key element 
of the creation of professional administrative systems. Furthermore the develop-
ment of accountability mechanisms that allow citizens to hold the administration 
directly accountable (in particular, administrative court systems, Ombudsman 
institutions and Citizens’ Charters) are highly important to the development of 
democratic systems of governance. There is still an obvious distrust of citizens in 
public administration institutions, mainly as a result of the role the administration 
played as an instrument of suppression under the previous regime. 
 
The development of modern accountability systems has been a difficult process in 
all Central and Eastern European states. The move from an accountability system 
based on accountability to one leading political party, towards a balanced ac-
countability system which makes the administration accountable to the citizens,  
– either directly, or through elected politicians or through the judiciary –, cannot 
be considered completed in the large majority of candidate states. The legalistic 
culture of Central and Eastern European states provides little opportunity for the 
introduction of innovative accountability mechanisms (such as Citizens’ Charters 
etc.), though in some of the candidate states (Hungary, Latvia) the possibility of 
developing a system of direct accountability to citizens has been raised. 
 
FULFILLING THE REQUIREMENTS FOR FUNCTIONING IN THE EU 
35
Parliaments continue to focus mainly on law-making, with little progress in the 
development of parliamentary control capacities. This has severely weakened the 
position of Supreme Audit institutions, which have been established in all candi-
date states, but they can have little influence unless parliaments follow up on the 
reports produced by these institutions.  
 
The same holds, to a lesser degree, for the new Ombudsman institutions which 
have been created in several candidate states (Poland, Hungary, Lithuania, 
Slovenia, Romania). Ombudsman institutions also depend in part on the willing-
ness and ability of parliaments to follow up on reports provided to them. However, 
the rather high degree of independence that has been granted to the Ombudsman 
institutions created in Central and Eastern European states has provided these 
institutions with the possibility to play a pro-active role in fighting maladminis-
tration and arbitrariness in administrative conduct. Ombudsman institutions have 
been important to the development of greater trust between citizens and adminis-
tration, as their reports and actions have provided citizens with a greater sense of 
confidence in trying to seek remedies against administrative malpractice. The 
capacity of Ombudsman institutions to deal with the cases brought to them has 
been stretched in all states, proving the need for the creation and development of 
independent institutions that citizens can approach to address complaints, without 
having to rely on the generally overburdened court system.  
 
Administrative court systems have been developed in few countries only, though 
most of the candidate states have constitutional provisions in place that call for the 
creation of an administrative court system. The establishment of specialised ad-
ministrative court systems has in most states been postponed for financial reasons. 
Cases related to actions of the administration are dealt with by specialised 
chambers in the ordinary courts. The court system remains overburdened in the 
candidate states, limiting the degree to which the judiciary can be used as an 
effective accountability instrument. 
 
Finally, there has been little progress in the development of enabling management 
systems inside administrations. The move from administrative accountability 
towards managerial accountability systems has not been made in most candidate 
states, which leaves administrations with too little flexibility to become responsive 
to citizens. The current wave of corruption allegations, which is common to 
practically all candidate states, will not help the process of creating more flexible 
management systems in Central and Eastern European administrations, as there is 
a general move towards limiting managerial discretion and tightening top-down 
controls. Whereas this is a logical response to the ever-increasing allegations of 
corruption in the administration, it will do little to stimulate the development of 
modern accountability systems. 
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EI management systems  
One area of structural development in which considerable progress has been made 
in candidate countries is the creation of dedicated institutions and structures for 
the management of the European Integration process (hereafter EI). A SIGMA 
inventory carried out in 1997 showed that the legal basis for the institutional 
framework has been created in all countries and, with few exceptions, all the 
institutions provided for in legislation had been created (SIGMA Papers No 23, 
1998). These structures and institutions have been further developed and, with few 
exceptions, improved since then. Table 2 provides an overview of the type of 
structures in place, based on the SIGMA review and later analyses of EI management 
systems. 
 
Table 2 Dedicated Structures for EI-related decision-making (1999) 
Level 1:  
Top level decisions  Created or planned Not planned or created 
Special Council of Ministers 
Meetings 
Bulgaria  
Council of Ministers plus 
Advisory Council 
Slovakia  
Council of Ministers, but filtered by 
Ministerial committees: 
Permanent and non-permanent 
Members16 
Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Hungary, Slovenia 
 
Council of Ministers, prepared by 
ministerial committees with 
Variable membership17 
Romania  
Level 2 and level 3: 
Preparatory work 
  
Permanent Committee of Deputy 
ministers or committee of senior 
civil servants 
Czech Republic, Lithuania, 
Hungary, Estonia, Poland, 
Latvia, Slovenia 
Romania (ad hoc meetings), 
Slovakia (ad hoc meetings) 
Committee of deputy ministers18 
and committee of senior civil 
servants 
Bulgaria  
Co-ordinating secretariat   
European secretariat all countries (de facto)  
 
It is important to note that even though special decision-making structures at 
ministerial and senior official level have been put in place in most candidate states, 
these rarely function as real ‘filters’ in the policy process. Furthermore, most of the 
policy-making systems in the candidate states lack a true arbitration institution. 
The strong position of line ministries and the high degree of collegiality in 
decision-making make it extremely difficult for arbitration systems to develop, 
leading to an overload of government agendas, much like in the ‘ordinary’ policy 
arena. However, as has been pointed out before, well-functioning policy-making 
systems that allow governments to set priorities swiftly are even more important in 
the EU policy process than in the national context, as the EU often requires rapid 
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decision-making processes. This is therefore an issue to be addressed in the overall 
reform of policy processes. 
 
The location of European secretariats has been a problematic issue in many 
candidate states, creating ‘turf wars’ over the control of the EI secretariat between 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and institutions concerned with management of 
‘internal aspects’ of EU affairs. Traditionally, EI secretariats in most member states 
are located within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However, with the growing 
weight of the national dimension of EU policy-making, other ministries, in 
particular Ministries of Economic Affairs, have obtained an increasingly important 
role. It was therefore interesting to see whether the candidate states have opted to 
establish the secretariat at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, or whether they have 
taken into account the changing nature of the EU policy process. The following 
table reflects the current (end of 1999) institutional location of secretariats in 
candidate states.  
 
Table 3 Institutional location of EI Secretariats 





Integrated part of 
the Centre of 
Government 
Other ministry or inde-
pendent administrative 
unit reporting to the 
Centre of Government  




Latvia, Lithuania, Poland 
 
It should be noted that out of the four states in which the main secretariat is placed 
at the Centre of Government, two also have a small secretariat for foreign policy 
issues at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  
 
The development of capacities within line ministries to manage EU affairs has been 
an uneven process in candidate states. Generally ministries have created special 
units for EU affairs, but there is significant variation as to the tasks and formal 
position of such units. In many cases and instances EI units also manage the 
international relations of the ministry, indicating that often EU affairs are still 
perceived as foreign affairs. As a consequence, EI units often are not sufficiently 
integrated in policy development in the line ministries, and have only limited 
abilities to ensure that EU-related obligations are met. The high degree of minis-
terial autonomy which still characterises administrative systems of the Central and 
Eastern European states, has in some cases led to a high degree of diversity 
between EI management models in individual countries. In general, however, 
European Integration issues are not well integrated in the daily routine of line 
ministries. This in turn is one of the contributing factors to the difficulties that 
most countries face in terms of inter-ministerial co-ordination systems. Often 
systems of inter-ministerial working groups are little more than a dead letter. 
Whereas the central decision-making structures for EU affairs are relatively 
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permanent, frequent changes have been made in the structure and position of 
working groups. 
 
Structures for the management of the approximation of laws are generally well-
established. Procedures to ensure compliance of new legislation with EU standards 
have been put in place, though they function with varying degrees of effectiveness. 
The procedures put in place, however, mostly deal with the process inside the ad-
ministration. Relations between the administration and parliament in the approx-
imation process are often not sufficiently developed. This can pose problems in 
particular under coalition governments and under governments which lack a clear 
majority in parliament. Furthermore, whereas compliance control systems are 
well-developed, most states have weak capacities for planning the approximation 
process, making the planning process highly ‘Commission-driven’, taking too little 
account of the impact of an early adoption of EU standards on economic sectors. 
 
The SIGMA reviews and other analyses of the emerging EI management systems 
point out continuing weaknesses in the policy-making systems. Insufficient co-
ordination capacities are a general problem for most Central and Eastern Euro-
pean administrations. A second key problem is the slow progress in creating new 
institutional networks for policy implementation. This affects policy implemen-
tation in EU affairs just as much as policy implementation in any other area. The 
concerns over implementation capacities expressed by the European Commission 
in the ‘avis’ and regular reports on progress are in line with this analysis. Apart 
from the development of policy co-ordination capacities and the construction of 
policy implementation networks, the lack of qualified personnel is the other main 
weakness of the policy-making systems for EU affairs. 
 
Systems for the management of EU affairs have been put in place in all candidate 
states, and even though the quality of these systems differs, the existing systems 
can probably cope with the preparation for accession. Whether these structures 
will be sufficient to manage EU affairs once countries join the Union is a different 
matter. Substantial improvements will have to be made of policy co-ordination 
systems, implementation capacities and the development of modern accountability 
mechanisms, in addition to the improvement of policy development capacities, if 
the candidate states are to become effective participants in the EU policy process. 
 
 
3.2.4 CONCLUSION ON THE COMPARATIVE REVIEW 
In three key aspects of administrative reform in the Central and Eastern European 
region achievements have been limited still. Often civil service legislation, where 
adopted, has not been (fully) implemented, or has not been used as an instrument 
to further the development of a stable and professional civil service. Due to the 
lack of investment in the development of indigenous training institutions and the 
by now generally obsolete character of training provided by foreign institutions, 
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training is little more than a potential catalyst for administrative development. 
Much work remains to be done on the rationalisation of administrative structures 
and policy processes and the development of modern accountability systems. The 
development of dedicated systems for the management of EU affairs – which will 
be based on the current EI management systems– is the one area of structural 
reform where adequate progress appears to have been made. 
 
 
3.3 EXPLAINING LIMITED PROGRESS IN ADMINISTRATIVE  
CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT 
Analyses of administrative reform process have generated a wealth of possible 
explanations why administrative reform programmes often fail to deliver desired 
results. The comparative analysis of the ‘administrative reform experience’ of nine 
states19 in ‘Public Management Innovations’ (Verheijen and Coombes 1998) leads 
to the following list of key factors that can determine success or failure of public 
administration reform processes. 
 
Factors that contribute to failure of reform processes are: 
• administrative reform strategies are often designed ‘on the drawing board’ 
without sufficiently ‘testing’ their feasibility or involving the main stake-
holders in the process of the design; 20 
• the value of legislation as a reform tool has been generally overestimated. 
Adopting (a) law(s) does not necessarily lead to changes in the operation of 
the administration.21 Law as a reform instrument only works if other con-
ditions are fulfilled simultaneously;  
• administrative development does not win votes, politicians therefore tend to 
lose interest, even if they subscribe in principle to the need of creating 
efficient, professional and reliable administrations; 
• administrative reform programmes need to be pursued over a long period of 
time if they are to have significant results. Therefore administrative reform 
processes will generally fail under conditions of high turnover between 
governments, unless they are based on a broad consensus between political 
forces; 
• the need to ‘win over’ civil servants, either by involving them from the start or 
by ‘changing administrative culture’ is a highly underestimated element of 
reform programmes; 
• the transferability of administrative reform strategies is limited; approaches 
to reform that have been applied in other states are unlikely to lead to success, 
unless these are well-adapted to local conditions. 
 
Several key factors that can contribute to the success of reform efforts are: 
• the economic situation and the real need for reform (depending on the 
conditions present in the state);22 
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• external pressure (but only under certain conditions);23 
• strong and persistent leadership by politicians with strong convictions about 
the need to reform the state; 
• the use of the right ‘package of instruments’, combining legislative instru-
ments with other types of measures and providing the right balance between 
‘stick and carrots’. There are no universal prescriptions for this aspect, since 
‘the right package’ is different for each state, but the need to use a balanced set 
of instruments, without relying too much on one tool, can make an important 
contribution to a successful reform process. 
 
 
3.3.1 THE ABSENCE OF ‘SUCCESS FACTORS’ 
Two out of the four factors identified above as potentially important in creating the 
right conditions for a successful administrative reform policy, are generally in 
place in Central and Eastern Europe. However, on closer inspection, the specific 
conditions in the candidate states have limited the impact of these factors.  
 
Economic pressure could at first glance be a catalyst for the initiation of adminis-
trative reform processes, as there still are serious budgetary pressures in all can-
didate states. Efficient and effective administrations are also needed to attract 
foreign investment, to ensure state income from taxation and to perform a number 
of other tasks crucial to the often still fragile economic recovery processes. Also, 
the weakness of administrations has been considered an important factor in the 
economic crises, which have plagued several candidate states in recent years. 
Therefore there appear to be several strong economic arguments for the priori-
tisation of administrative development. However, even though economic con-
ditions at first glance constitute a potential incentive to politicians to move ad-
ministrative development forward, the specific nature of the administrative reform 
processes in Central and Eastern Europe has so far created the reverse effect. This 
nature of administrative ‘reform’ is often misunderstood. The use of the word 
‘reform’ in itself would mean that the objective of the process would be to change 
an existing administration. However, Central and Eastern European states did not 
have a ‘public administration’ as it is generally understood in European adminis-
trative tradition.24  
 
Administrations under the previous systems only carried out some of the functions 
they were expected to perform in democratic systems of government; they merely 
dealt with policy implementation, under strict control of the Communist Party. 
Policy development was a function of the Party administration. Party administra-
tion and public administration were often ‘merged’, creating a heavily politicised 
administration. Employment conditions of civil servants were regulated under the 
Labour Code, which basically erased the difference between the state administra-
tion and other sectors of the economy, which had been clearly established in 
Central and Eastern European states before the Second World War. Administra-
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tions as ‘bridges between government and society’ did not exist under the previous 
regime. This has important implications for the nature of the processes under way, 
which are processes of developing new administrative systems, not of reforming 
established systems. The above factor might to some degree also explain why 
Hungary has performed better than the other candidate states in assessments of 
administrative capacities. The gradual (limited) economic liberalisation in 
Hungary already brought about some changes in the role of the state in that 
country, as a small private sector started emerging in the 1980s. To some degree 
this has given Hungary an advantage in the development of a new administrative 
system after the start of the transition in 1989. 
 
It is important to note that building a professional, stable and impartial adminis-
tration is costly and requires a considerable investment, even if one opts for the 
creation of a limited ‘career’ civil service.25 The costs of recruitment, training and 
the employment conditions associated with a career civil service are considerable, 
both in the immediate term and for the future.26 The notion of administrative 
reform as used in Western Europe and other OECD states, the main objective of 
which is usually saving money, therefore does not apply to Central and Eastern 
European states. The economic conditions in these states thus make the im-
plementation of reform strategies more difficult, rather than easier. 
 
A second potentially contributing factor for the implementation of a successful 
administrative development process is external pressure. At first glance, external 
pressure to carry out administrative reform seems to be considerable. The EU is the 
main organisation to have important political leverage in the region. EU member-
ship conditions include the creation of a stable, professional and accountable 
administration, which should provide incentives to Central and Eastern European 
governments. However, the EU has been far from consistent in the signals it has 
sent to the candidate states. The re-orientation of PHARE assistance towards the 
development of sectoral administrative capacities through twinning arrangements 
between candidate states and member states, could be interpreted by governments 
in the candidate states as an indication that general administrative capacities are 
of less importance than the creation of technical capacities to implement and en-
force the acquis communautaire. The Commission has shown awareness of the 
potential dangers inherent in this approach and has continued to put pressure on 
candidate states to create a stable and professional civil service. However, if some 
financial support for general administrative development is not continued, there is 
a strong likelihood that the concerns about the development of sectoral capacities 
will move the development of a professional and coherent administration further 
down the political agenda.  
 
Other institutions, in particular the World Bank and the IMF, have also increasingly 
put pressure on Central and Eastern European governments to give more priority 
to administrative development. The interest of the World Bank, and to a lesser 
degree the IMF, in promoting public administration development is still quite 
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recent and it is too early yet to predict to what degree these institutions will be able 
to have a significant impact in this area. However, it should be noted that the work 
of the World Bank in particular has generally focused on improving management 
in public administration, rationalising central government structures27 and the 
development of fair and sustainable reward systems. These are some of the core 
issues identified earlier on as crucial to the success of public administration 
development. In this respect the work of the World Bank has the potential to 
become a catalyst for administrative development in years to come.  
 
The other two factors which could contribute to the successful implementation of 
administrative development processes, i.e. long-term consistent policies, backed 
by strong politicians, and the use of a well-balanced set of reform instruments, cer-
tainly do not apply in Central and Eastern Europe.  
As regards continuity in policies, voters have virtually on every occasion thrown 
out the government in office, which certainly does not stimulate the development 
of consistent policies over a long period of time. This affects administrative 
development policies in particular, since these are not ‘vote-winning policies’. As 
an aggravating factor, political party systems remain highly polarised, which 
further reduces the potential for continuity in policies. Interestingly, this appears 
to affect economic policies (where there generally is a certain degree of continuity 
even when governments change) much less than administrative development. 
However, the reversal of administrative development measures, strategies and 
even laws remains common practise throughout the region, including states which 
were considered to have overcome the high level of adversity deemed 
characteristic for states in transition or in the early stages of consolidation. The 
absence of long-term policies to stimulate administrative development therefore 
does not need to come as a surprise.  
 
The use of a well-balanced range of reform instruments, a fourth potentially 
positive factor, also lacks in Central and Eastern European states. In terms of 
public administration development, politicians seem to have misunderstood the 
term ‘Rule of Law’ as ‘Rule by Law’. The adoption of laws has so far been the main 
and sometimes the only administrative development tool. Where administrative 
development strategies have been adopted, they are often little more than a 
framework for a package of laws. The problems with this type of approach to 
administrative development is that (i) the value of laws as a reform instrument 
depends heavily on the quality of their implementation, and that (ii) laws do not 
change mentalities. The serious problems that have arisen with the implemen-
tation of laws were already discussed earlier on, and these implementation pro-
blems have certainly reduced the value of law as a reform instrument. In terms of 
changing mentality, the development of well-integrated training systems, which 
could be a core instrument in attempts to change mentalities, is conspicuously 
absent in almost all Central and Eastern European states.28 The development of 
innovative incentive systems, a second way of stimulating a change of mentality, 
has not yet been started, in part due to a lack of resources, but also because this 
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goes against the still prevailing egalitarian mentality in many Central and Eastern 
European states. For the time being, administrative development strategies rely on 
the adoption of laws and the gradual replacement of older staff by new recruits. 
Under a continuation of this approach, it will take a generation to build new 
administrations. 
 
The over-reliance on laws as reform instruments would not come as a surprise to 
those who have studied Central and Eastern European tradition. Most states have 
a strong legalistic tradition, based either on the German, Austrian or, to a lesser 
degree, the French model, and stemming from the pre-World War II period. The 
approach of the previous regime (creating legitimacy through law) has strengthen-
ed, rather than weakened the legalistic bias. The EU, which also focuses very much 
on legal requirements for membership, has, perhaps involuntarily, strengthened 
this bias towards using legal instruments in administrative development. It is im-
portant that advisers to Central and Eastern European governments put more 
emphasis on the development of a multi-instrument approach to administrative 
development, stressing the importance of law as one but not the only reform 
instrument. The formation of multi-disciplinary reform teams would be an 
important step in this direction.29 
 
 
3.3.2 THE PRESENCE OF ‘INTERFERING VARIABLES’ 
If we then turn to the factors which can hinder the implementation of a successful 
administrative development policy, one can find these strongly present. Reform 
strategies are often designed by outsiders, in many cases foreign consultants, with 
little or no input from the administration.30 This was true in particular where the 
development of such strategies was done under PHARE projects. Furthermore, they 
are in many cases based on approaches which have been tried and tested in West 
European states, and have not been sufficiently adapted to local conditions. 
Finally, they tend to be developed without consulting the administration, which 
has proven to be a recipe for failure in a number of OECD states in the past. 
Considering these three points, it might come as less of a surprise that 
administrative reform strategies remain ‘paper tigers’, with little impact. 
 
The adoption of laws, the second element of central government reform efforts, 
has also had a limited effect so far. Politicians have developed ways to limit the 
impact of civil service laws, to ensure that they keep their ‘right of interference’ or 
‘right to the spoils’.31 Loopholes in laws have been used extensively, new govern-
ments have halted the implementation of laws, or laws have simply been inter-
preted according to the wishes of a new government, making them virtually use-
less. The long period of time over which the implementation of civil service laws, 
for instance, has been spread in Poland and Latvia, led to a significant difference 
between the original objective of the civil service laws in these states and the 
(likely) final result of their implementation, if they had been implemented at all. 
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The fact that reforms are still almost exclusively based on law makes reform failure 
easier to understand. The application of a mixed strategy to bring about reforms, 
relying on legislation as well as training and the creative use of incentive systems, 
would certainly have had more significant effects. 
 
There are obviously politicians and senior officials that have tried to win their 
colleagues over to the cause of administrative development. However, these 
potential ‘champions of administrative development’ have in most cases not been 
in a sufficiently strong position in the government or the administration to allow 
them to push through their reform agenda.32 This is both due to the short-lived 
nature of many governments in Central and Eastern Europe, which stimulates 
short-termism, and due to the still prevailing deep political polarisation, which 
makes politicians reluctant to work with civil servants appointed by ‘the other 
side’. The relative lack of support for potentially influential external actors has 
often left these ‘champions of administrative reform’ even more isolated. 
 
 
3.3.3 LIMITED PROSPECTS FOR RAPID IMPROVEMENT? 
The main causes for the very limited achievements in administrative reform at 
central government level are multiple and complex. A lack of political commit-
ment, political polarisation, mixed signals from external institutions which could 
make a difference, an inheritance of partisanism and politicisation, and the lack of 
innovation and creativity in using reform instruments stand out as the main 
causes of ‘reform failure’. The next question is obviously how change can be 
brought about. 
 
Criticising Central and Eastern European governments for their failure in improv-
ing central administrations is as easy as finding viable alternatives is difficult. The 
complex reasons why reforms have failed to produce good results are difficult to 
address. For instance, it is clear that politicians need to be convinced of, one could 
even say ‘converted’ to, the idea of a professional administration. This remains one 
of the keys to a process of successful development of professional and impartial 
central administrations. However, even if one could enthuse the politicians 
currently in government and parliament by means of training and providing in-
formation, the considerable turnover among parliamentarians would still make it 
difficult to find a long-term solution for this problem. Building a ‘political culture’ 
which accepts the idea of an impartial public administration has taken decades in 
most European states. Re-introducing the concept to societies which have had 
impartial administrations in the past (at least to some degree) might take less 
time, but still more time than is available until EU membership will be a reality. 
 
A much hoped for reduction in political polarisation in the medium term would 
speed up the process of making permanent and professional administrations 
acceptable to politicians not only in theory but also in practise. However, at the 
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current time there are few indications that polarisation is actually decreasing. 
Politics in most of the EU candidate states has become more, rather than less, 
polarised.33 
 
A change in reform instruments, a second measure to be considered, might 
seemingly be easier to bring about. Using training as a reform instrument, for 
instance, does not appear to be a controversial issue. However, for a variety of 
reasons it is unlikely that there will be a considerable change in the use of reform 
instruments. First, the EU membership requirements still focus primarily on the 
adoption of laws and regulations, even though more attention is devoted to train-
ing in the Progress Reports of 1998 and 1999 than in the Opinions of July 1997. 
Second, whereas the adoption of laws is relatively ‘cheap’, the investment required 
to develop sustainable training capacities would be considerable. This also ex-
plains in part why the adoption of laws as such has not led to serious changes: 
implementing laws does require budgetary means, which very often are not made 
available. The EU has in recent times devoted increasing attention to implemen-
tation records, which might help bring about a change in focus among politicians 
in the candidate states. However, the real impact of laws remains doubtful as long 
as they are being adopted for the sake of meeting external requirements rather 
than out of internal commitment. 
 
Finally, the possibility in generating pressure by involving citizens should not be 
neglected. Raising public awareness of citizens’ rights vis-à-vis the administration 
and marketing reforms is an often neglected but important tool in moving ahead 
in Public Administration Reform. Reform-oriented politicians should be encour-
aged and assisted in using this instrument, which, however, can only work in 
combination with the other methods discussed in this section.  
 
The above arguments might lead one to conclude that the results of central 
government reform might remain limited in the foreseeable future. There are 
indeed serious issues to be addressed regarding the development of new central 
government systems in Central and Eastern Europe, two of which were briefly 
discussed in this section. However, adopting a different approach to supporting 
administrative development from the outside might help in ‘making a difference’. 
The complex issues at stake in central administration development cannot be 
addressed by imposing formal EU requirements or by designing short-term support 
actions, with a focus on law drafting and one-off training activities. What would be 
required instead is a policy of coaching and supporting reform-oriented politicians 
and experts to bring about gradual change, both in attitudes of politicians and in 
the way administrative development is carried out. It is important to start looking 
at public administration ‘reform’ as a process of development and to think of long-
term strategies, rather than short-term measures. Even though short-term 
pressures might make it difficult to win acceptance for such an approach, it 
remains, in my view, the only way forward if Central and Eastern European states 
are to develop sustainable high quality central administrations.
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NOTES 
1  This is a specific term often used to indicate institutions and processes in 
member states which are used for the preparation of national positions and 
the implementation of EU decisions. In the context of the candidate states 
these structures are being developed for future participation in the EU policy 
process, but are currently used to management the European Integration or 
accession process. 
2  With the exception of the constituent states of the semi-federal member states, 
Austria, Belgium, German and Spain, which, however, are not generally 
considered ‘local self-governing authorities’, as they have wide legislative 
powers. 
3  The NISPAcee Annual Conference provides one of the main platforms for 
academic discussion on developments in public administration in Central and 
Eastern Europe 
4  The opinion on Slovakia was negative while the opinions on Bulgaria and 
Romania speak of development in the right direction. On the other states the 
opinions were generally positive. 
5  The main exception is Hungary. 
6  Based on material collected for the comparative study of civil service systems 
in Central and Eastern Europe referred to above. The number of citizens ex-
pressing trust in the central administration varies between countries, but in 
the nine states dealt with in the study (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Slovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Russia and Yugoslavia) confidence ratings never 
exceeded 40%, with a low of 10% in Russia. 
7 In Latvia the process has not yet been completed 
8 Interestingly, this was not so much the case after the previous elections 
9  All employees of the central administration became civil service candidates 
under the law and were supposed to undergo training courses and pass an 
examination before they could become civil servants. 
10  The provisions of the law made it rather easy to make changes in the division 
between political and career positions, which was used by the incoming 
government in Autumn 1996 to bring about significant changes in the 
administration. 
11  Even though the law is completely new, it still relies on the German/Spanish 
model for organising the politico-administrative interface. 
12  Under the 1994 civil service law all officials in the Latvian administration were 
civil service candidates. 
13 For instance, Chancelleries, Prime Minister’s Offices, Cabinet Offices or 
Council of Ministers’ Offices. 
14  Hhttp://www.oecd.org/puma/sigmaweb/acts/cogprofs.html. 
15  As an example, in-depth reviews of European Integration policy co-ordination 
systems in three Central and Eastern European states, carried out by SIGMA in 
1998, confirmed that there is still a high degree of reluctance among 
politicians to ‘decentralise’ policy co-ordination. 
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16  In most cases these ministerial committees can take decisions on operational 
issues, but not on any issues with legal implications. 
17  Ibid. 
18  This committee acts as an advisory body to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
19  Bulgaria, Slovakia, Hungary, the UK, France, Ireland, the Netherlands, 
Australia and New Zealand (1984-1990 only). 
20  For instance, the Fulton Reforms in the UK, the Devlin Reforms in Ireland, 
reform attempts in the Netherlands in the early 1970s, but also several reform 
projects in France (see Keraudren in Verheijen and Coombes 1998). 
21  A point clearly taken to heart by Margaret Thatcher, who in the initial phase of 
the UK reforms refrained from using laws as an instrument. The New Zealand 
experience of 1984-1990 shows, however, that the use of laws, as part of a 
well-designed reform package, can produce the desired results. 
22  The cases of Australia and New Zealand provide a good illustration (see 
Schwartz 1996). 
23  Under the condition that the external actor has some leverage (for instance 
conditionality of financial assistance or membership of the organisation) and 
this leverage is used consistently and over a long period of time.  
24  On the nature of administrations under the previous regime, see for instance 
Josza (1988). 
25  Under consideration, for instance, in Latvia, where the number ‘civil service’ 
posts is unlikely to be higher than some 200. 
26  Considering, for instance, the cost of pensions. 
27  In particular in Latvia. 
28  Exceptions are Poland and Latvia. The Polish School of Public Administration 
is an integrated part of the Polish administration. However, this school is still 
too small and not sufficiently integrated to have a fundamental impact. In 
Latvia, basic training for all civil servants was an element of the administrative 
reform strategy. However, the Latvian programme was cut significantly after 
the change of government in 1997. 
29 I owe this point to Michal Ben-Gera, former Head of Policy-Making, Co-
ordination and Regulation at SIGMA. 
30  The Bulgarian administrative development strategy provides an interesting 
counter-example in this respect. It was developed by a group of Bulgarian 
consultants (STRATEGMA), with limited foreign input. 
31  See the section on civil service laws for examples.  
32  This has been the case in Latvia, to a lesser degree in Hungary, but also, for 
instance, in Romania. 
33  The attempts of incoming governments in Bulgaria (admittedly a special case), 
Poland and Hungary in 1997 and 1998 to ‘convert’ administrations by means 
of dismissals, using loopholes in laws etc. shows the still deeply seeded sense 
of suspicion between political forces. 

WAYS OF DEALING WITH DEFICIENCIES: A REVIEW OF ALTERNATIVES 
49
4 WAYS OF DEALING WITH DEFICIENCIES:  
A REVIEW OF ALTERNATIVES 
Central and Eastern European candidate states will face difficulties in completing 
their administrative preparation for EU membership in time. With the notable 
exception of Hungary, candidate states have made too little progress in public 
administration development, which has proven to be a highly complex and diffi-
cult process. The legacy of the previous regime, which wiped out any notion of an 
impartial and professional administration, combined with the continuing high 
degree of political polarisation, the lack of creativity in using reform instruments 
and a lack of financial resources are the main hindrances to the development of 
the high quality systems of public administration needed for effective participation 
in the EU political system.  
 
The EU itself has started using general administrative capacity requirements late 
on in the accession process, and the current emphasis on sectoral capacity require-
ments will make it less likely that all candidate states will be able to develop their 
overall administrative infrastructure in time for accession. Furthermore, it is per-
ceived unlikely by candidate states that any state will be denied accession to the EU 
for deficiencies in the overall system of public administration. As long as key 
economic and political criteria are met and the most crucial sectoral administra-
tive enforcement structures are put in place and the EU manages to reform its own 
structures, it is likely that states will gain accession even if general administrative 
capacities are insufficient. 
 
 
4.1 THE INDIRECT EFFECT OF ADMITTING MEMBER STATES WITH 
DEFICIENT ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEMS 
It might not be obvious at first glance why the lack of professional administrations 
would pose problems for the EU as a political system. The general perception is 
that it will mostly be the candidate states themselves that will suffer directly from a 
lack of adequate administrative capacities. This view is reflected in a way in the 
prevailing attitude at the European Commission, which is that the general im-
provement to administrative systems is a matter for the candidate states them-
selves, to which the EU is not prepared to make a significant financial contribution. 
As a result the EU is concentrating heavily on addressing those problems which 
might have a direct impact on the EU system, such as internal and external finan-
cial control and audit. Thus the fact is ignored that the impact of the accession of 
states with insufficient general administrative capacities on the EU system can 
nevertheless pose serious problems to the effective functioning of the EU, even if 
the impact is of an indirect nature. Two issues are of importance in this respect: 
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1 to what degree could the possible impact of the accession of states with in-
sufficient administrative capacities affect the principle of mutual trust 
between member states? 
2  to what degree could a lack of administrative capacities lead to the accession 
process having a longer term negative impact on the level of economic devel-
opment of (some of) the candidate states? 
 
 
4.1.1 ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES AND THE PRINCIPLE OF MUTUAL TRUST 
One of the key principles underlying the mode of operation of the EU system is 
mutual trust between member states in each other’s institutions. The mutual trust 
between member states has come under significant pressure in recent years, due to 
capacity problems in some member states as well as to the tensions created by the 
BSE crisis and its aftermath. However, it remains an important principle of EU co-
operation. Mutual trust in the EU context has several aspects, two of which deserve 
special attention in the framework of this study: 
• the assumed ability to play the EU decision-making ‘game’; 
• the assumed national capacities to deal with the workload generated by policy 
implementation requirements. 
In both areas the entry of a large group of states with inadequate general adminis-
trative capacities could pose a threat to the functioning of the EU. 
 
In relation to the first aspect, it is important to highlight the specificity of this 
‘game’. Participation in EU decision-making poses highly specific requirements: it 
necessitates much faster action of civil servants and politicians than policy-making 
at national level and presumes the presence of good networking and coalition buil-
ding capabilities. Even new member states with highly developed administrations, 
such as Sweden and Austria, faced problems operating inside the system in the 
first months after accession. In this case it affected not so much the EU system, as 
both states adapted rapidly to the requirements, but rather the new member 
states, which were unable to influence EU decision-making adequately. However, 
the entry of a larger group of states which would be unable to ‘play the game’ and 
that would face problems for a longer period of time, would jeopardise the EU 
decision-making system.  
 
There are two main risks in relation to this point. First, if a large group of states 
would be consistently outvoted or sidelined, due to their inability to adequately 
prepare national positions, this could lead to these states being less than enthu-
siastic about fulfilling their implementation tasks. It is true that there are states 
like the UK and Denmark which have been repeatedly outvoted in the past, but this 
has been due rather to political differences over the direction in which the EU 
should move than to a lack of administrative prowess. It is also a more or less 
accepted aspect of participation in the EU system for these states given their 
political and administrative culture in which decisions agreed to at EU level would 
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be implemented as a matter of principle. This type of political and administrative 
culture is not present in the current candidate states. A go-slow attitude on policy 
implementation tasks would widen the divergence in implementation rates 
between member states, putting serious pressure on the functioning of the 
Internal Market in particular. 
 
A second, and more serious, risk is a collapse of the ‘filtering system’ of Working 
Groups and COREPER. States are generally expected to express a consistent position 
throughout the decision-making process, i.e. positions taken in Working Groups 
and COREPER I and II are considered a commitment and are expected to be respec-
ted in meetings of the Council of Ministers. The participation of a large group of 
states in the system that would not respect this ‘rule of consistency’1 could easily 
bring the decision-making system to a standstill. In this respect it is important to 
note that one of the weakest elements of administrative systems in Central and 
Eastern European states is exactly the lack of delegation inside the system, which 
leads to too many matters of detail appearing on the agenda of national Council of 
Minister’s meetings. This last point is the crucial point of difference between the 
candidate states and some of the member states, such as the Netherlands, that 
might also suffer from fragmentation in the central administration, but that 
nevertheless have adequate ‘filtering’ mechanisms in place that prevent an over-
load of the cabinet agenda. Furthermore, the ‘rule of consistency’ is generally 
adhered to by these member states, regardless of weaknesses in internal co-
ordination. 
 
Obviously, the expected long duration of the negotiation process might already 
lead to a gradual adaptation of national capacities and processes in the candidate 
states, as this will be an important learning process for their administrations and 
politicians. Problems of this nature can certainly be avoided, as long as they are 
acknowledged and addressed in a timely manner. Currently, however, there seems 
to be too little awareness in the EU of the need to try to take up this type of poten-
tial problem before accession. It is therefore important that the issue of the opera-
tion of the filtering system in Working Groups and COREPER is put on the agenda of 
the upcoming IGC, and that procedures and working methods are reviewed and 
streamlined to allow for more effective decision-making. Simultaneously, a process 
of coaching and persuasion should be started with the candidate states to ensure 
that effective policy co-ordination and filtering mechanisms are put in place in 
their administrations. 
 
The second aspect of mutual trust is the ability of member states to deal effectively 
with the policy implementation generated by EU membership. It is true that this 
mostly relates to sectoral capacity development in relation to enforcement struc-
tures. In this area adequate progress would have to be made before accession, as 
this could be a potential reason for the postponement of accession. However, a 
second aspect of EU policy implementation is the degree to which member state 
administrations have the capacity to absorb the workload generated by EU mem-
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bership.2 Deficiencies in this area would almost certainly not be a sufficient reason 
to postpone accession. It is important to note that a number of member states are 
already facing problems in coping with this workload. The entry of new member 
states with inadequate administrative capacities would thus come on top of the 
already ongoing erosion of the principle of mutual trust inside the EU system.  
 
The policy implementation related problems in the EU political system have two 
main causes. First, the increasing pressure of EU obligations on member state 
administrations, due mainly to the tasks arising out of the operation of the 
Internal Market, has created difficulties for a number of the member states. The 
gap between best performing and worst performing member states, if measured in 
terms of transposition records and the number of infringement cases, has not 
narrowed significantly.3 This has created occasional tensions between member 
states. Second, the inability of the Commission to properly fulfil its role as the 
‘guardian of the treaties’ has been exposed ever more clearly in recent years. The 
problems in the Commission, which are well-documented,4 are due to internal 
organisational problems, a lack of human resources (or, as some would argue, the 
availability of the wrong type of human resources5) and a far from optimal relation 
with member state administrations.  
 
 
4.1.2 ENSURING COMPATIBILITY BETWEEN EU ACCESSION AND ECONOMIC TRANSITION 
A second key administrative capacity related issue for the candidate states from 
Central and Eastern Europe is the administrative ability to ensure that the EU 
accession process and the economic transition process are mutually reinforcing 
processes. This question relates mostly to the sequencing of acquis implemen-
tation. The acquis implementation agenda set by the European Commission is 
largely driven by internal EU concerns. It certainly does not take into account the 
specificity of the economic transition process, which is still ongoing in many of the 
candidate states. Sequencing the adoption and implementation of the acquis in a 
way which does not take full account of this reality is potentially damaging for the 
economic development process in the candidate states. 
 
Sequencing the adoption and implementation of the acquis in a way that takes 
account of the specific economic transition context requires the development of 
capacities at government offices or European Integration units to analyse and 
assess the impact of following the implementation agenda as proposed by the 
European Commission. Such capacities are currently not developed in the candi-
date states. The absence of this specific element of administrative capacity might 
at first glance appear to be mainly the concern of the candidate states. However, 
the economic consequences of a ‘mismatch’ between preparation for EU accession 
and economic transition policies would most likely become visible only once states 
have actually joined the EU. This would have a potentially destabilising effect, not 
only on the new member states concerned, but also on the EU as a whole.  
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In view of the above, it is vital to look for ways in which these potential problems 
can be averted, as they are likely to come on top of much more direct and visible 
pressures which enlargement with ten Central and Eastern European states are 
certain to create. 
 
 
4.2 POSSIBLE WAYS OF AVERTING THREATS TO THE EU SYSTEM 
We can assume that at least some of the candidate states will enter the EU without 
having fully completed the administrative capacity building process, at least as far 
as the development of the overall system is concerned. This will add to the already 
existing pressures on the EU as a political system, as some of the current member 
states still face problems in meeting administrative capacity requirements posed 
by EU membership. It is therefore not only important to reflect on how to deal with 
the possible consequences of enlargement for the way the EU functions, but to 
think of ways in which the EU as an overall administrative system can be made to 
function more successfully as well. Therefore this section has been divided into 
two parts. The first section will assess ways of dealing with the possible problems 
posed by Eastern Enlargement, while the second section will reflect on how to 
address the problems of the EU administrative system as a whole. 
 
 
4.2.1 WAYS OF ADDRESSING REMAINING ADMINISTRATIVE DEFICIENCIES 
The potential problems posed by the Eastern enlargements were set out above: 
they relate both to participation in the EU decision-making process and to the 
ability to cope with the administrative workload generated by EU membership.  
 
In relation to the first problem, the main improvements required relate to internal 
policy flows and co-ordination capacities, which in turn depend on improved 
mutual confidence between civil servants and politicians. These are among the 
most difficult issues to tackle in any administrative reform processes, since they 
require changes in administrative culture. A full implementation of civil service 
laws, if carried out, might gradually lead to increased levels of mutual confidence, 
even in those states where politicisation has been most profound. Although this 
will be a long-term process, improved mutual confidence is a conditio sine qua 
non for the implementation of reforms to the policy formulation system. 
 
There is ostensibly not much the EU or member states can do to force more rapid 
improvements in this area, apart from continuing to stress the need for an effec-
tively functioning administration as a requirement for membership. However, as 
has been said before, this is unlikely to make much of a difference. For, general ad-
ministrative capacity requirements are not expected to be a stumbling block in the 
accession process. It is also unlikely that the EU decision-making system itself will 
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undergo fundamental changes in those areas which are likely to be most affected 
(the process of preparation of Council of Minister’s meetings through Working 
Groups and COREPER). 
 
The best and maybe the only possible way of stimulating progress in this area is 
therefore the application of coaching and persuasion methods. It should be 
stressed that interventions and assistance in this area should come from member 
states primarily or exclusively. Only member states can possibly persuade candi-
date states of the need to have their internal policy processes in order before 
membership and provide the necessary assistance to achieve this. Commission 
pressure in this area would simply lack the necessary credibility. Member states 
could offer assistance to candidate states in the form of exchanges, both to (junior) 
politicians and top officials, by placing them in EU units and core policy depart-
ments in ministries. Member states should realise above all that in the end it is in 
their own national interest if they intervene in this particular area. This is really a 
necessary investment. 
 
In the area of capacities to cope with the workload generated by participating in 
the EU system more instruments can be applied. For example, the European 
Commission could be provided with more extensive control capacities during a 
transition period, to be defined in the membership negotiations. The most radical 
method one could foresee is the Austrian approach to dealing with capacity 
problems in the Austrian states. If Austrian states are unable to transpose direc-
tives or adopt administrative measures in time to meet EU deadlines, the federal 
government can ‘take over’ these responsibilities. However, it is hard to imagine 
that such a method could be applied in the relation between the Commission and a 
sovereign member state, even for a limited period of time, since this would most 
likely be considered an unacceptable infringement on sovereignty. Ways of making 
the Commission more effective in supervising member states are best discussed in 
the overall context of EU institutional reforms and not in terms of the development 
of special transition arrangements for new member states. 
 
The method of active ‘coaching’ by individual member states in the period leading 
up to membership, as discussed above, could obviously be applied to this area, too. 
In general, member states should play a much more active role in assisting candi-
date states in their preparation for membership than has been the case in previous 
enlargements. The multilateral assistance provided by the Commission will not 
attend to these general problems related to administrative capacity requirements 
effectively. It is in the interest of member states themselves to work with candidate 
states on their entry into the EU system, both through active coaching, advice and 
persuasion. This requires a change in approach and attitude in member state ad-
ministrations and governments, which have to be convinced that the present en-
largement process cannot be managed by tried and tested methods from the past. 
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Finally, it is important to start a process of mutual confidence building between 
member states, candidate states and EU institutions. It is true that candidate states 
will still have to ‘travel’ a long way to get their administrations in good shape for EU 
membership. Much will depend on the internal ability of the candidate states to 
implement difficult reform measures. Nonetheless, this process could be stimu-
lated if the current general attitude of suspicion in member states, among poli-
ticians and citizens, is transformed into a more positive, supportive attitude. 
 
The growing atmosphere of suspicion in many member states is not conducive to 
the development of successful reform process in the candidate states. Regardless 
of the – in many cases – slow pace of reform in public administration in candidate 
states there has been a gradual progress in the administrative capacity develop-
ment. The best way to stimulate this progress is encouragement and support, not 
by adopting a sceptical and formalistic attitude. Politicians and officials in this 
respect have a duty to counteract the growing scepticism among citizens, rather 
than to fuel this rather worrying trend. 
 
 
4.2.2 ADDRESSING ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITY PROBLEMS AS PART OF AN OVERALL 
ADAPTATION OF THE EU ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM 
The application of tailor-made solutions to the specific administrative capacity-
related problems that could be generated by the Eastern Enlargement could 
possibly address the most problematic aspects of this process. If member states 
actively engage in coaching and persuasion work and the Commission’s super-
vision capacities can be strengthened, a sufficient level of mutual trust could most 
likely be maintained. However, the administrative capacity problem is not merely 
an accession-related issue. The EU system has been under a period of consistent 
pressure, and in part this has certainly been due to the divergence in administra-
tive performance of member states, as well as to the chronic under-performance of 
the Commission in its management and supervision tasks. Therefore, it will not 
suffice to deal with the specific problems generated by the Eastern Enlargement 
alone. The current enlargement process both provides the opportunity for and 
creates the necessity of re-thinking the administrative capacity requirements to EU 
membership and how these could be better defined and monitored. Two possible 
options could be considered here: 
1 the creation of an ‘administrative acquis’; 
2 the redefinition of the relation between the Commission and the member 
states. 
These would best be applied in combination 
 
Defining an ‘administrative acquis’ 
In the introduction to this paper the process of defining administrative capacity 
requirements for EU membership was discussed. The general administrative 
capacity criterion has been applied in the current round of enlargement for the 
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first time. A first real attempt of defining general administrative capacity criteria 
was completed with the definition of the ‘baselines for administrative capacities’ 
for the preparation of the 1999 Regular Reports on Progress. With the increasing 
importance of the EU, the need for achieving a certain degree of convergence in 
administrative capacities has become ever more obvious. Differences in adminis-
trative capacities can now directly affect competitiveness in the Internal Market, 
especially inside the ‘Eurozone’. In addition, the perceived administrative under-
performance of some member states has created increasing tensions in the EU 
system. The definition of minimum general administrative capacity requirements 
therefore seems to be an issue of general significance for the future development of 
the EU. 
 
In view of the above, it would be desirable to test the feasibility of defining an 
‘administrative acquis’, possibly based on the assessment criteria defined for the 
enlargement process. Obviously, it is not possible to adopt regulations or directives 
on administrative capacity requirements, as this would certainly be unacceptable 
to member states and would in any case violate the principle of subsidiarity. How-
ever, the creation of a charter of administrative capacity requirements, developed 
through a bottom-up process and agreed between the member states, could pro-
vide the necessary supplement to the mutual trust that governs the operation of 
the EU as a political system.6 Mutual trust is unlikely to continue to prevail auto-
matically in a system involving 28+ very diverse member states, which might call 
into question the viability of the EU system. The creation of a charter of adminis-
trative capacities, as an instrument of ‘soft law’, is a workable antidote to this likely 
erosion of mutual trust. Indeed, ‘soft law’ or ‘benchmarking’ is probably the only 
acceptable form of interference in what will continue to be viewed as an exclusively 
national area. An administrative capacity charter would contain those values 
shared between European states7 and would be implemented through a mecha-
nism of peer review, with related reporting requirements. It would constitute a 
logical follow-up to the definition of minimum requirements carried out in the 
enlargement process. 
 
Re-defining the relations between the Commission and  
member state administrations 
The second, and more obvious, element of the necessary process of ‘refurbishing’ 
the EU as an administrative system is the re-definition of the relations between the 
Commission and the member states. The relation between the Commission and 
member state administrations mainly remains a ‘core-periphery’ relation, as 
defined by Metcalfe (1993), based on a legal assessment by the Commission of 
member state measures to implement EU decisions.  
 
The limits of the legalistic bias in the relation between the Commission and the 
member states have been clearly exposed in recent years. Legal controls have done 
little to prevent fraud with EU funds in member states and there is little sign of 
significant improvement in member state implementation records. Maintaining 
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the same system in an EU of 28+ is likely to bring about the collapse of the EU 
political-administrative system. A review of the role of the Commission and the 
member state administrations in EU policy implementation and a re-definition of 
the patterns of interaction between them is therefore a necessity. 
 
One option is to increase the role of the Commission in policy implementation, 
providing the Commission with agencies to carry out implementation in certain 
areas. Unfortunately the limited experience with direct Commission implemen-
tation of policies, mainly through the agencies established in 1993, has been far 
from positive. This is mainly due to the aforementioned bias towards policy 
development and the limited management and supervision capacities at the Com-
mission. A successful application of the agency model to the European Commis-
sion would require a fundamental change of orientation at the Commission. As the 
experience in several member states with the implementation of a policy imple-
mentation system based on policy delivery through agencies has shown, this is by 
no means impossible to achieve. Furthermore, if there were an agreement on more 
direct policy implementation by the Commission, this could be taken into account 
in the current process of internal reform in the Commission. Changes in the 
recruitment and promotion systems would certainly be required. Needless to say, 
rapid decisions in this direction would have to be taken in the framework of the 
upcoming IGC. Additionally, the question arises in what areas direct imple-
mentation powers could be granted to the Commission. Some of the regulatory 
management tasks, now carried out by member states and supervised by the 
Commission, might be considered, as well as programme implementation tasks. 
This could alleviate some of the pressure on member state administrations, but at 
the same time would require an increase of staff at EU level, which can only be 
funded out of increased budgetary means that are unlikely to become available to 
the EU. These are just some of the obvious problems that would have to be addres-
sed if there were to be a move towards more direct implementation8. It is an 
option, however, that merits further study. 
 
A second alternative approach, as outlined by Metcalfe (1992, 1993, 1995) is to 
bring about a change in the nature of relations between Commission and member 
states, in other words, to change the nature of the system from a centre-periphery 
to a pluralist system. This would require the Commission to become a network 
organisation, forging co-operative relations between member state administra-
tions as well as between these administrations and the Commission. Implemen-
tation of regulations and directives would thus become a co-operative process, in 
which the Commission would act as a facilitator as well as a supervisory body, 
instead of dealing with control and supervision mainly. The Commission would 
have to enhance its capacities to properly inform, brief and, in particular in new 
member states, coach national administrations in the implementation of policies, 
above all in the area of transposing directives. In any event, exercising effective 
‘punitive’ control over 28 member states in the same way as has been the practise 
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so far is certainly going to be an impossible task for an organisation which failed 
impressively in its monitoring and supervision tasks in recent years.  
 
The change in the operation of the EU administrative system, from hierarchy to co-
operation and networking, will require a change in attitude and mentality in both 
Commission and member state administrations. The potential administrative 
capacity problems related to the enlargement process provide an opportunity to 
address structural problems in the relations between the EU and member state 
institutions. These are much less a problem of the division of competencies 
between member states and the EU than of the nature of the overall policy-making 
system. An in-depth reflection on options to alter the policy implementation 
system is in this respect even more important than the debate on the decision-
making process. A reflection on the reform of the policy implementation system 
should consider both the ‘agencification’ option as well as ways in which the role of 
member states and the Commission in the implementation process can be altered. 
 
 
4.3 FINDING AN OPTIMAL MIX OF MEASURES 
The potential problems of Eastern Enlargement are best addressed within the 
framework of an overall process of re-orientation of the EU as a political and ad-
ministrative system. An active and intensive process of coaching, persuasion, 
advice and assistance by member states might be sufficient to address the poten-
tial dangers arising from the entry of a group of new member states, a majority of 
which might not have completed the necessary administrative preparation process. 
There are indirect but potentially serious risks to the decision-making process as 
well as to effective policy implementation, which could further erode the mutual 
trust which has generally characterised the EU. This is true all the more if one takes 
into account the increasing pressure on levels of mutual trust inside the EU system 
in recent years.  
 
There is a need to enshrine and supplement this mutual trust as well as to review 
and adapt the way the EU functions to the requirements of a deepened and en-
larged Union. In addition to the need to coach, persuade and assist candidate 
states, there is therefore a need to adopt a set of minimum standards that ad-
ministrations of member states should meet. Such a set of standards should be 
based on shared administrative values. It could be adopted on the basis of 
common agreement by member states and implemented through a peer review 
system. 
 
More importantly, it is necessary to change the way the EU system operates from a 
hierarchical, legalistic mode of operation to a co-operative networking system. 
This might sound like a daunting challenge to those who know the EU system. A 
challenge, however, that should nevertheless be taken up if the EU is to continue to 
function relatively smoothly with a membership of 28+ highly diverse states. 
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NOTES 
1  Obviously there are member states that do not at all times respect this in-
formal principle, but it is generally viewed as desirable. 
2  This ranges from the transposition of directives, through the reporting re-
quirements on technical regulations, to the monitoring and supervision tasks 
related to the implementation of agricultural, regional and social policy. 
3  The gap between best and worst performing member states, as published in 
the Commission ‘league tables’ remains 8-9% in terms of directive trans-
position records and significant differences remain in the number of in-
fringement cases brought against member states. 
4  See for instance, Comité van Onafhankelijke Deskundigen (15-3-1999), Eerste 
rapport over beweerde gevallen van fraude, wanbeheer en nepotism bij de 
Europese Commissie. 
5 The recruitment system of the Commission continues to be geared towards the 
recruitment of candidates with good analytical and policy development quali-
ties, while management and networking capacities are in fact some of the key 
qualities required if the Commission is to effectively fulfil its role of ‘Guardian 
of the Treaties’. 
6  The Dutch government started a process of discussion on the issue of public 
administration development and European Integration during the last Dutch 
Presidency in 1997, in particular through the organisation of a conference 
involving member states and candidate states, which was expected to be 
followed up under the British presidency. However, the British presidency did 
not prioritise this issue and no follow-up was given to the initiative. 
7  For one approach to the definition of common values, see SIGMA paper 27, 
European Principles for Public Administration. 
8  Other problems would be the reform of the Comitology system, and the in-





The fulfilment of general or horizontal administrative capacity requirements is one 
among many criteria for EU membership and a relatively minor issue if compared 
to the democracy, market economy and acquis implementation capacity criteria. 
Nevertheless, it is important to reflect on the implications that the accession of ten 
Central and Eastern European states will have on the EU system. General adminis-
trative capacity requirements are possibly the last area in which EU membership 
criteria were developed, since this is a completely new area for the EU. The rele-
vance of this criterion was acknowledged only relatively late on in the pre-acces-
sion process. A new assessment system, consisting of a set of baselines, was tested 
for the first time in the preparation of the 1999 Regular Reports on Progress, and 
is likely to be the basis also for future assessments.  
 
Administrative capacity assessments have generally produced a picture of lack of 
progress, regardless of statements of intent, reform strategies and even adopted 
legislation. In the last three assessments of candidate states only Hungary was 
generally assessed as having made sufficient progress to meet the administrative 
capacity criteria in the short to medium term. 
 
A comparative review of the development of administrative capacities in candidate 
states also paints a sombre picture of general lack of progress. The review took into 
account three key elements of administrative development: 
1 civil service legislation and civil service policy;  
2 the development of civil service training systems; and  
3 structural reform of policy processes, including the construction of modern 
accountability systems and dedicated structures for the management of EU 
affairs.  
Administrative development in Central and Eastern Europe is a highly complex 
issue, due to a combination of a negative legacy in terms of public administration 
left by the previous regime, a general lack of financial resources for investment in 
administrative development and a continuing high degree of political polarisation. 
 
The entry of a large group of new member states with inadequate administrative 
capacities can pose threats to the EU as a political and administrative system, in 
particular to the decision-making system and the policy implementation system. 
In order to prevent these potential problems from bringing the EU system to a 
standstill, a set of actions should be considered for implementation.  
First of all, member states should engage in a concerted set of actions to persuade 
and assist candidate states in improving policy processes and administrative 
quality. This should go beyond the type of assistance provided under Commission 
assistance programmes, which will not be sufficient to address these more general 
capacity problems.  
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Secondly, member states should work on the development of an agreed set of 
standards for administrative capacities, which should apply to all member states 
and should be implemented through a process of peer review.  
 
Finally a concerted effort needs to be made to change the EU’s policy implemen-
tation system, in particular by putting relations between the Commission and 
member states on a new footing. This is urgently needed, in order to prevent the 
inevitable collapse of the current system of monitoring and supervision. Two 
options to be considered and studied in this respect are:  
1 the extension of direct implementation in some areas in which the EU has ex-
clusive, or even broad, competencies; and  
2 changing the implementation process, ensuring more constructive interaction 
between Commission and member state administrations in the transposition 
of directives and the implementation of other policy measures.  
The adoption and implementation of a package of actions of this nature would 
pave the way for an EU of 28 or more member states that could function effectively 
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